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Objectives of the study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to present different lease valuation techniques from the existing lit-
erature that can be used when assessing a financing decision of an aircraft and then test these 
methods in practice with the actual data provided by Finnair. The case framework used is an ac-
quisition of a new Airbus A330-300 widebody airliner. The main question is should the aircraft be 
purchased or leased under an operating lease. This leads to actual hypotheses which question 
whether operating lease is more cost-effective than purchasing in less than 10 year period or in the 
long run. Eventually the analysis provides a financing decision model for Finnair. 
 
Research method and data 
 
The research method of this thesis is a single-company case study. My analysis will be based on 
cash flow-based valuation techniques such as Net Present Value (NPV) and its more advanced de-
rivative adjusted present value (APV). The results of the model are examined with a sensitivity 
analysis and further enhanced with a risk analysis tool utilizing Monte Carlo simulation. There a 
thousand simulations are made to find the deviation of present values.  The data includes current 
and estimated market values and lease rates of A330-300 provided by an independent valuation 
company. 
 
Findings of the study 
 
My first hypothesis, “operating lease is more cost-effective than purchasing in less than 10 years' 
time”, was clearly accepted as the results from both NPV and APV were indisputable. The second 
hypothesis, that the above holds also if the time period is extended, remains unanswered or can 
even be rejected. Although APV still very strongly suggests leasing over purchasing, NPV starts to 
draw nearer to purchasing. Still statistically leasing is the preferable choice but it is apparent that 
when the time period is lengthened, the purchase becomes more tempting. As a conclusion, ac-
cording to my analysis in current market environment Finnair should lease the A330 under an 
operating lease agreement rather than buy it. This is true especially if the considered utilisation of 
the aircraft is rather short. 
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Tutkimuksen tavoitteet 
 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on nykyisestä kirjallisuudesta esitellä erilaisia leasingin arvostusmene-
telmiä, joita voidaan käyttää lentokoneen rahoituspäätöksen arvioinnissa ja sitten kokeilla näitä 
menetelmiä käytännössä Finnairilta saadulla aineistolla. Tutkimus perustuu uuden Airbus A330-
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visella leasing-sopimuksella. Tämä johtaa varsinaisiin hypoteeseihin eli onko operatiivinen leasing 
kannattavampaa  kuin ostaminen alle 10 vuoden tai pidemmällä aikavälillä. Tutkimuksen myötä 
Finnairille valmistuu malli rahoituspäätöksen analysointiin. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and background of the study 
Since the beginning of leasing related literature the burning question of to lease or purchase 
has confused both academic and business world. Arguments from tax benefits to off-balance 
sheet characteristic and from capital preserving advantages to flexibility have been expressed. 
Many theories have merged, some more accepted than others, but main reasoning still 
remains around tax and accounting benefits of leases. Also the substitutability of the lease and 
debt surrounds many current discussions. Present understanding is that they might not after all 
be perfect substitutes which would rationalise leasing and have implications on firms’ optimal 
capital structures as well. In addition, today an ever-increasing focus is given on non-financial 
features that leasing provides and how they could be properly measured. Flexibility gained 
from leasing is one of the most commonly heard justifications in the literature but to 
indisputably measure it is a much more complicated story.  
As a method of financing, leasing seems to be ever so popular at the moment. Especially in 
the airline industry leasing seems to be increasing. Gritta et al. (1994) reported that main US 
carriers already had 54% of their fleet leased in 1991. According to CIT (2011), 38% of the 
current world fleet of aircraft has been leased compared to only 3% in 1980. This percentage 
is now expected to rise above 50% by 2015. Gibson and Morrell (2004) find that about 25% 
of the aircraft are flown under an operating lease. Current economic conditions also have an 
effect on this but it should be stated that leasing isn’t any more just a financing method for 
financially constrained companies as it used to be.  It can be rather seen as a modern, strategic 
financing tool that enables very flexible fleet planning needed in this turbulent and constantly 
changing environment. 
When considering an airline company whose balance sheet is comprised mainly of expensive 
aircraft  the  lease  or  purchase  question  becomes  very  valid.  Minor  benefits  gained  from  the  
correct financing decision can make a big difference when assets are worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars. But what makes this complicated is first, academic literature is not 
omniscient and second, the industry is highly cyclical and uncertain, and thus the analysis of 
the financing decisions is difficult. Most often non-financial or operational reasons are used to 
advocate leasing over debt. But that leads to a need for valuation methods beyond financial 
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aspects which furthermore leads to subjective opinions and choices in valuation. So far, it 
might already be evident that we are on an unravelled territory. 
Today, airline business is recovering from the worldwide depression and is trying to return on 
profit by increasing the amount of passengers while cutting the unit costs. A revival seems to 
be already underway and future shows glimpse of hope in this highly cyclical industry. What 
comes to airline financing today, naturally both debt and leasing is used but there is now ever 
so increasing trend of promoting particularly operating leases. They seem to offer flexibility 
desired by airlines in this uncertain state and perhaps assist companies with low cash reserves 
or uncertain future cash flows. That said, the role of the lessors in the aviation leasing 
business seems to be emphasized in past few years. At the same time, leasing has become a 
strategic source of flexibility to many of the world's major airlines. 
It is clear that no one comprehensive and clear answer to this lease or purchase dilemma 
exists but by exploring several different perspectives and theories this thesis tries to offer 
better understanding of the complexity of this decision as a whole. At the same time this 
thesis aims to introduce some theoretical models from existing literature and compare their 
suitability  to  the  case  company’s  needs  so  that  best  of  them  could  be  used  in  the  case  
company’s decision making process in the future. The need for this kind of analysis seems to 
be apparent because finance departments of airlines do not necessarily capitalize on all useful 
methods available. (Gibson and Morrell, 2005)  
In  industries  like  airline  business  where  the  assets  consist  mostly  of  airplanes  this  kind  of  
analysis has a great importance and creates concrete benefit. Increasing trend of operating 
leases and increased role of the lessors in the airline business makes this topic very current. 
What makes this topic also very current is that changes in IFRS account policies probably 
during the year of 2013 have significant effects on treatment of leases, especially operating 
leases which can be seen as off-balance sheet items (although they have been disclosed in the 
notes to the accounts). However when implemented new IASB and FASB Proposals state that 
all leases would need to be recorded on balance sheet as the present value of the “right-to-
use” asset and a corresponding lease liability. The purpose of these changes is to make 
financial statements even more transparent and comparable. Companies with lots of operating 
lease  liabilities  have  to  be  prepared.  The  effect  of  policy  changes  on  certain  key  ratios  and  
therefore on credit ratings cannot be ignored.  
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In their survey in 2005 Gibson and Morrell discover distinct differences in airlines’ financial 
evaluation methods, interactions between investment and financing decisions and risk 
management. They find that airlines do not appear to consistently capitalize on the most 
advanced techniques available in the market. This may sound peculiar considering the extent 
of assets in airline business. However, managers are not all to blame for. This under-usage of 
methods may be explained by the fact that managers have not unlimited time to study all new 
researches. This observation raises even more the importance of this kind of comparison of 
the different valuation methods in airlines.  
1.2 Research objectives & Hypotheses 
Fortunately  I  was  given  an  exceptional  opportunity  to  implement  different  methods  in  real  
life. Finnair, the major airline in Finland, provided the setting needed to apply relevant 
theories to practice. The purpose of this thesis is to present different valuation techniques 
from the existing literature that can be used when assessing a procurement of an aircraft and 
then test these methods in practice with the actual data provided by Finnair. The case 
framework used is an acquisition of a new Airbus A330-300 widebody airliner, which Finnair 
already has eight in its fleet. This thesis provides a selection of techniques that can be used in 
the future in the case company and enables an interesting opportunity to test these theoretical 
models  in  action.  The  effects  and  implications  of  the  usage  of  different  techniques  are  then  
discussed and compared. The eventual aim of my thesis is to provide a model for Finnair that 
can be used in real life with a set of inputs to analyse this financing decision. 
An acquisition comprises an investment and a financing decision, at least in theory. The 
purpose here is particularly to analyse the financing decision and the problematic of deciding 
whether to purchase or to lease an aircraft. This means that the investment decision has 
already been done and now it is relevant to examine how to finance the acquisition. Many 
experts, however, suggest that these two decisions cannot and should not be separated in real 
life because of their strong influence on another. If you first choose the aircraft and only then 
analyse how to finance it you might not end up with the best result. One important reason for 
this  is  that  different  aircraft  manufacturers  can  offer  quite  different  finance  terms.  The  fleet  
planning and acquisition of aircraft should from the start of the process be connected to the 
finance. However, because fleet planning escapes from the scope of this thesis, it is simpler to 
study the financing decision in isolation. The thesis will present both financial and non-
financial aspects of the leasing dilemma and utilize a combination of different cash flow 
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based models from the academic literature to achieve the best possible solution for this rather 
complicated question. It is rather matter of using an appropriate and versatile tool set than 
relying only on some one method. 
In  addition  to  providing  a  model  for  Finnair,  my thesis  tries  to  answer  a  couple  of  relevant  
questions. Leasing is often thought to be more expensive than purchasing. A lessee is seen to 
make a choice between the decreased risk and increased price. However, because of the 
increased popularity of leases, one might argue that this is because leases are actually under-
priced and therefore cheaper than the costs of actually buying an asset. Therefore, I will first 
ask if operating lease is cheaper than purchasing in typical time period of aircraft lease. This 
is followed by a supplement question does this also hold when the time period is extended. 
This  is  also  relevant  question  as  it  is  commonly  referred  that  leases  are  preferable  in  short  
time horizons but purchasing is always better option in the long run. So, my hypotheses are: 
H1: Operating lease is more cost-effective than purchasing in less than 10 year period. 
and 
H2: Operating lease is more cost-effective than purchasing in the long run. 
1.3 Methodology of the study  
My analysis will be based on cash flow-based valuation techniques such as Net Present Value 
(NPV) and its more advanced derivative adjusted present value (APV). I will then enhance 
the model with a sensitivity analysis and further with a sort of risk analysis tool utilizing 
Monte Carlo simulation where a thousand simulations are made to find the deviation of net 
present values. This measure makes it possible to explain with what probability the present 
value is for example positive and thus favours leasing. My analysis will exclude non-cash 
flow based models like real options analysis due to their challenging framework and a heavy 
required involvement of the management. 
1.4 Structure of the study 
The thesis is constructed as follows: It begins with this introduction chapter and then 
continues to present the case in chapter 2. Chapter 3 reviews definitions and previous 
literature and is followed by data and methodology presentation in chapter 4. Chapter 5 
discusses about the results while chapter 6 finally concludes. References and appendices are 
found in the end of the study, in chapters 7 and 8. 
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1.5 Findings of the study in brief 
The thesis presents literature and different valuation methods of leasing and uses cash flow 
based methods like NPV and APV to determine whether it is preferable to purchase an Airbus 
A330 airliner for Finnair or operate one under an operating lease agreement. My first 
hypothesis, “operating lease is more cost-effective than purchasing in less than 10 years' 
time”, was quite clearly accepted as the results from both NPV and APV were indisputable. 
The second hypothesis, that the above holds also if the time period is extended, remains 
unanswered or can even be rejected. Although APV still very strongly suggests leasing over 
purchasing, NPV starts to draw nearer to purchasing. Still statistically leasing is the preferable 
choice but it is apparent that when the time period is lengthened, the purchase becomes more 
tempting. In brief, it seems that in current market environment Finnair should lease the A330 
under an operating lease agreement rather than buy it. This is true especially if they are 
considering a rather short deployment. Although interest rates are low which could encourage 
direct debt finance, this theoretical model illustrates that financing costs of leasing are lower 
than costs related to purchasing.  
2 CASE 
This chapter will now introduce the case studied. Chapter will start with an industry outlook 
including a presentation of aircraft finance business as a whole. It will continue then by 
introducing the case company and the specific acquisition under the loop of my thesis. 
2.1 Commercial airline industry - overview 
2.1.1 Current market outlook 
Airline industry has always had its turbulences and the cyclicality comes with the business, 
and not least today. The industry has been forced to face one of the greatest and probably 
long-lasting challenges to date. The current global crisis or recession has been on-going since 
the end of 2007 and has taken many forms from burst of housing bubble in the United States 
to the credit crunch and from financial to European sovereign debt crisis. Although maybe the 
worst part could be already over, this prolonged state of instability and imbalance is toxic for 
airlines. The thick veil of uncertainty at the moment is evident and dominates the current 
market outlook. The economic environment is challenging altogether but especially for airline 
business which is very sensitive to overall condition of the economy. As a service industry, 
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air transport is heavily dependent on the state of the economy for its growth. When economy 
is struggling, it is felt immediately in airlines as business passengers dissolve to economy and 
the  demand for  air  travel  is  decreased  as  a  whole.  In  addition  to  economic  conditions,  also  
many other factors affect directly to airlines. Political tensions and wars naturally have an 
effect on oil prices and therefore on flying. Natural disasters like earthquakes and following 
tsunamis in Asia in 2004 and 2011 can decrease the demand of air travel substantially. 
Terrorist attacks such as those in 11.9.2001 in the United States can also have long-lasting 
effects.  Furthermore,  also  major  health  issues  like  SARS  or  bird  flu  have  seen  to  have  an  
instant and powerful, and sometimes local, impact on passenger amounts and profitability of 
the airlines. What is common in all these events is that the negative effect on the industry can 
be noticed quickly whereas the revival from it is much slower. 
Because of recent difficulties in economy, airline industry faces clear pressure for cost cuts. 
Profitability needs improvement as profit margins are low and the demand can be insecure. 
Meanwhile the cost structures are generally quite heavy in many traditional airlines, including 
Finnair. This has forced many airlines, again like Finnair, to introduce efficiency measures to 
push down costs. Especially fixed costs need to be brought down. Naturally also operating 
costs are tried to be diminished. 
However, cost cuts are only a temporary solution. Airlines need to be profitable to sustain in 
the long run. Airline industry has historically been characterized by cyclicality, sensitivity and 
unfortunately low-profitability. Introduction of low-cost carriers have complicated the 
traditional air carriers’ situation even further. LCC’s have changed the field permanently by 
dumping prices and offering overcapacity with totally new business models and low cost 
structures.  The heavy price competition is just one example of these newly witnessed features 
of the modern competition. Today bankruptcies are pretty common and consolidation is ever 
so popular, and not just through mergers and acquisitions but also via alliances. A rising trend 
is also privatization of carriers. Because of long traditions of being national necessities, 
airlines are historically government-owned. To become more market-oriented, many 
companies have been privatized during the last two decades. Finnair is actually one of the 
remainders  of  that  privatization  wave  along  with  British  Airways,  Lufthansa  and  Iberia.  
Overall, I think it is reasonable to say that the whole business is in a sort of turning point. This 
revolution will eliminate the weakest competitors and only those who can adapt to today’s 
market and its regularities can survive. 
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So, for airlines it is crucial to be able to adapt quickly to changing environment and to react to 
demand changes as quickly possible. This is what makes leasing so preferable in today’s 
world of aviation. The flexibility is  crucial  to cope with the competition.  In a highly capital  
intensive industry, this effect is emphasized. However, before explaining the finance field of 
airline business I will review the current market conditions followed by future outlook.  
According to Oxford Economics every year approximately 2.5 billion passengers and 50 
million tonnes of freight are flown worldwide. 1 In 2007, European airlines alone transported 
about 700 million passengers and carried 10 million tonnes of freight. The global industry 
produces annual revenues of over $600 billion as IATA presents.2 
In their December 2012 outlook and January 2013 financial monitor3, IATA, The 
International Air Transport Association, forecasts $6.7 billion airline net profits in 2012. 
Despite continued high fuel prices and a slowing world economy, airline profits and cash 
flows managed to stay at levels similar to 2006/7, when economic environment was stronger 
and oil prices $40 lower per barrel. Profits are still lower than in 2011 but yet better than 
expected due to challenging business environment.  
2012 started poorly but the second and third quarter showed an improved performance. This 
is mainly achieved by improved industry structure and airlines reacting to challenges with 
cost cuts. During the last quarter profits seemed to be settling but were still positive. Globally, 
the best performers are Asia-Pacific area and North America while Europe will only break 
even. That is, however, a solid achievement considering the damaged home markets due to 
Euro-zone crisis. IATA forecasts zero profit for Europe also in 2013.  
 
                                               
1 http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/publication/open/222513, retrieved 9.10.2012 
2 http://www.iata.org/pressroom/facts_figures/fact_sheets/Documents/industry-facts.pdf, retrieved 6.3.2013 
3 http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Industry-Outlook-December2012.pdf, 
http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/AirlinesFinancialMonitorJan13.pdf, retrieved 25.2.2013 
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Graph 1. Airline net post-tax profit margins. Source: ICAO, IATA. 
 
Jet fuel prices have fluctuated around $130 a barrel for the past two years. There has been 
upward pressure on prices during 2012 which eased momentarily towards the end of the year 
but continued after OPEC cut crude oil production in December. This caused price to jump 
back above €130/bbl in January. Jet fuel prices have not increased substantially during past 
two years but they are considerable higher compared to pre-2010 levels. A higher kerosene 
price seems to be a new standard and this will have a great impact on airline profitability. 
 
Graph 2. Jet fuel and crude oil price. Source: Platts, RBS. 
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A noticeable trend of 2012 was that airlines kept capacity growth below the increase in 
demand. This means that airlines are increasing their operations at slightly lower rate than the 
increase in demand. This is being done despite the strong number of new aircraft deliveries. 
As a result the load factors have increased and remained at record-high levels throughout the 
whole year. 
 
Graph 3. Total load factors on passenger and freight markets. Source: IATA. 
 
Also a distinct feature in today’s aviation market seems to be consolidation. It is most obvious 
on the US domestic market, where several mergers have contributed to the stability of 
capacity. Also new joint ventures have been witnessed. In Europe, the industry structure has 
been reshaped by exits. These concern both low cost carriers (LCC’s) as well as network 
carriers. IATA explains that although the stronger airlines have improved their performance, 
the weak have got weaker and this has caused several bankruptcies. The number of start-ups 
has decreased substantially as a result of the financial crisis due to difficulties to raise finance. 
These changes in industry structure have been a significant factor in airline business 
resurrection. Airlines have been given a chance to gain from their efficiency measures and 
protect their cash flows while encountering weak economic growth and high fuel prices. 
However, that hasn’t changed the fact that the industry remains highly competitive and the 
profitability and returns on capital remain very weak. As IATA describes, in a normal 
industry competition would force returns down to the cost of capital (WACC) but in the 
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airline industry competition is so intense that even in the good years returns on invested 
capital fail to reach the industry’s cost of capital.  
 
Graph 4. Return on invested capital in airlines and their WACC. Source: IATA. 
 
In addition to already challenging business environment, the global economic growth has 
been very slow. The global GDP growth is close to 2% which has historically turned out to be 
a critical point where after airline industry profits turn to losses. 
 
 
Graph 5. World economic growth and airline profit margins. Source: IATA. 
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Both passenger and freight markets finished 2012 strongly, supported by a further increase in 
business confidence. Even in difficult market environment, air traffic managed to grow 5.3%. 
This is in line with the long term averages and future forecasts by Boeing and Airbus 
reviewed later. Large airlines achieved EBITDA figures between 10-15%. Finnair’s 
respective figure was 7%. 
2.1.2 Future market outlook 
Based on the better performance of the industry in 2012, IATA has revised their forecast of 
industry profits in 2013. They expect the net post-tax profits to cumulate up to $8.4 billion 
this year which means a small, but less than expected, improvement from the year 2012. The 
growth is expected to be driven by slightly higher economic growth and slightly lower fuel 
prices. Anticipation for global economic growth, however, has been vanished. Overall, the 
global air travel is expected to increase but the growth can be slow. In addition, airline 
capacity management allows load factors to remain solid, thus helping financial performance. 
However, because of uncertainties in global economic growth, the demand for air transport 
remains fragile. According to IATA Business Confidence Survey, the survey made among 
airlines, Airline business confidence improved in January. Despite the global economic 
weaknesses, respondents showed improved profitability expectations in the next 12 months. 
Restructuring and consolidation actions together with efficiency measures have helped 
airlines and increased their confidence in the future.4 
European aircraft manufacturer giant Airbus considers it remarkable that although the 
industry is facing one of its biggest challenges at the moment, it still has managed to grow 
over 50% since 2000 when measured with RPK.’s.5 Indeed, this time period includes such 
events as WTC attack, SARS and on-going financial crisis. This shows incomprehensible 
adaptability of the industry and confirms the constantly increasing demand for air travel. The 
graphs  below  illustrate  how  resilient  the  traffic  growth  in  the  end  is  to  external  shocks.  Of  
course the impact of Gulf War, WTC attacks and global financial crisis are clearly seen in 
annual growth rates but annual RPK’s are at worst remained constant. As Airbus puts it, 
people want and need to fly and that’s the base of their future forecast as well. 
 
                                               
4 http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/BCS_Jan_13.pdf, retrieved 2.3.2013 
5 Revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) is a common measure of the volume of passengers carried by an airline 
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Graph 6. World annual traffic in RPKs since 1970. Source: ICAO, Airbus. 
 
Graph 7. Annual growth and RPK’s. Source: ICAO, Boeing 
 
Airbus presents that the growth in airline business has come so far from the demographic 
evolution, increased wealth, progressive liberalization of air transport, globalization and 
availability of efficient, operationally capable aircraft. In the future, however, the two main 
factors driving the growth according to Airbus are global economic activity and the price of 
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travel. The growth seems to be approximately 5% annually. Both Airbus and Boeing forecast 
the average growth rate to continue as same 5% by year 2030. 6 
 
Graph 8. World annual RPK – forecast. Source: ICAO, Airbus. 
 
Airbus expects the growth to be driven by emerging regions, especially China. China is 
currently the fastest growing market with lots of people, bigger cities and more wealth. An 
increased middle class means more first time fliers while the demand is stimulated by 
growing tourism and internationalization. Asia-Pacific area is an essential part of the global 
economy today, representing more than a quarter of it. Airbus describes how the economy in 
this area is growing 2.5 times faster than in Europe. This makes the region a main driver of 
global economic growth and air transport. In the future, its importance will be further 
emphasized as its market share is estimated to top one third of the world economy within 
twenty years. Airbus estimates that 56% of the economic growth between 2011 and 2031 will 
come from emerging regions. The three largest regions, as per airline bases, will be Asia-
Pacific, Europe and North America with traffic contributions of 32%, 24% and 20%, 
respectively in 2031. The economic world in 2031, however, is probably quite different from 
today. China, the 3rd largest economy today, will soon take the second place over Japan while 
India, 8th at the moment, is estimated to squeeze into top three world economies by 2025. This 
estimated growth especially in Asia is naturally of the utmost importance to Finnair, whose 
core business will be long-haul flights to that region. More about Finnair’s perspective will be 
                                                
6 http://www.boeing.com/commercial/cmo/pdf/Boeing_Current_Market_Outlook_2012.pdf, retrieved 
29.10.2012 
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covered later in this chapter. But overall, despite the positive outlook in the long run, the next 
few years may offer airlines still considerable challenges due to highly insecure environment. 
This growth means naturally more aircraft.  The Airbus Global Market Forecast (GMF)7 for 
2012-2031 reveals a need for over 27,000 new passenger airliners delivered within that time 
frame. The Global Market Forecast also anticipates a more than doubling of the world’s 
overall passenger aircraft inventory, from 17,000 in today to more than 35,500 by 2031. 
Boeing is even more courageous by estimating the need for 34,000 new airplanes to increase 
the total fleet to almost 40,000 aircraft in 2031. Today, 85% of all aircraft in the world is 
being delivered by these two main manufacturers, European Airbus and American Boeing.8 
During 2012 they delivered 588 and 601 commercial aircraft, respectively. According to 
Aircraft Finance Report 2013 prepared by Flightglobal.com, net orders for Boeing and Airbus 
totalled 2036 aircraft accounting for a highest ever combined order backlog of 9055 aircraft.  
 
Graph 9. Global fleet development, 2012-2031. Source: Airbus. 
 
                                                
7 http://www.airbus.com/company/market/forecast/?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=27599, retrieved 2.3.2013 
8 http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/emptys/102389/aircraft-finance-2013.pdf, retrieved 
2.3.2013 
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2.1.3 Aircraft financing environment 
According to Boeing9,  stable  demand  growth  together  with  high  jet  fuel  prices  is  the  key  
element which drives the aircraft replacement willingness to more fuel efficient airplanes. 
Main manufacturers have record-long backlogs which means long waiting times and scarcity 
of delivery positions. Boeing believes that this will ensure adequate availability of capital for 
airlines to fund the deliveries. Boeing expects aircraft financing markets to be liquid in 2013 
despite the uncertainty but they are concerned about increasing fees and equity requirements 
for export credit transactions. At the same time, commercial bank debt is suspected to become 
more restrictive and expensive. Therefore, the role of the lessors and capital markets will be 
emphasized. 
 
Graph 10. Aircraft financing environment. Source: Boeing. 
 
During 2013, the aircraft industry are expecting deliveries worth roughly $104 billion, an 
increase of 10% from $95 billion this year, says Kostya Zolotusky, managing director at 
Boeing Capital Markets in Businessweek.10 95% of these deliveries come from Airbus and 
Boeing. He expects this figure to go up to $132 billion in 2017. So clearly this is a large and 
                                                
9 http://www.boeingcapital.com/cafmo/brochure.pdf, retrieved 27.2.2013 
10 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-12-04/boeing-says-aircraft-financing-will-reach-104-billion-record, 
retrieved 27.2.2013 
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constantly expanding business. The burning question today is who will finance all these 
deliveries? 
The graph above illustrates the diversity of the aircraft financing environment. As Boeing 
explains in their Current Aircraft Finance Market Outlook11, the sources of aircraft financing 
are changing because of the financial crisis in Europe. Timothy Myers, Vice President and 
General  Manager  of  Aircraft  Finance  in  Boeing,  recognizes  this  change.  He  explains  how  
traditional aircraft financiers, European banking community, are facing increased challenges 
and this has caused a shift in a market place. Also new regulations like Basel 3 are affecting 
these institutions. For 2013, the bank debt market appears to be stronger than year ago and 
more globally diversified as well. European banks continue to dominate but for example 
Japanese banks are expected to return to global markets with the support of banks from 
United States, Australia and Middle East. China recently loosened its monetary policy and 
this will increase the share of Chinese banks as financiers of domestic deliveries. Overall, 
Boeing believes that commercial bank market will improve in 2013. 
Previously popular financing source, accounting for almost a third of all financing, the 
government backed-up export credit will become more expensive as the new Aircraft Sector 
Understanding (ASU) by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development will be 
fully implemented. This means higher fees and equity requirements. It is estimated that the 
new ASU will  raise  the  credit  premium for  all  borrowers  but  the  stronger,  and  better  rated,  
airlines will suffer the most from this new agreement.12 Therefore the export credit support 
for new aircraft deliveries is expected to decline in 2013 as airlines will choose other more 
attractive options like commercial debt financing or operating leases, explains Kostya 
Zolotusky in Flightglobal’s Aircraft Finance Report 2013. 
Zolotusky and Myers agree that this current setting will push more and more airlines to 
choose leasing rather than buying an aircraft. Myers believes that operators’ fundamental 
desire  isn’t  to  own aircraft  but  focus  on  their  main  task,  to  fly  people.  Boeing  reasons  that  
with export credit and commercial bank debt available to fewer customers and at higher 
prices, more airlines are likely to lease airplanes. According to Flightglobal, operating leasing 
companies reached a 40% market share of new deliveries at Airbus in 2012. Boeing strongly 
believes that half of the global fleet is under an operating lease in ten years' time.  
                                               
11 http://www.boeingcapital.com/cafmo/brochure.pdf, retrieved 27.2.2013 
12 http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/emptys/102389/aircraft-finance-2013.pdf, retrieved 
2.3.2013 
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The next natural question is where will the lessors find their financing? Lessors are used to be 
more self-funded but today only 5% of deliveries are financed from their parent companies’ 
balance sheets. According to Scheinberg (2010), many corporate parents suffered from the 
recent economic collapse and lost large fortunes. Without the support form their parent, 
leasing companies are forced to turn to other options. Boeing thinks rapidly increasing 
participation of new and returning commercial banks together with a significant expansion of 
capital markets funding is the answer for the question above. Boeing’s Zolotusky states that 
capital markets have become more important for lessors and foreign (not US-based) carriers. 
U.S. airline have traditionally used capital markets more extensively but now this trend is also 
landing in Europe. Boeing expects capital markets’ contribution to increase significantly in 
2013 resulting to segment financing 15 per cent of aircraft deliveries next year, up from 6 per 
cent in 2012. This will compensate the expected decline of credit export of 7 per cent.  
In addition to previously mentioned methods, Boeing reminds that the environment is still 
very uncertain and manufacturers may be forced to support buyers with some backstop 
financing for future deliveries. Myers adds that the industry may see an increased amount of 
also other forms of financiers, such as pension funds, insurance companies and sovereign 
wealth funds. He thinks that these are very ideal aviation financiers because they have long-
term liabilities they need to match the assets with and aircraft are a perfect choice for that. 
 
 
Graph 11. Sources of financing for Boeing deliveries. Source: Airbus. 
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2.1.4 Aircraft leasing 
According to recent estimates, the increasing trend of operating leases in modern aviation 
business is evident as approximately one-half of the world's aircraft fleet is operating under 
some kind of lease and according to Gavazza (2010b) about one third specifically with the 
operating lease. Indeed, there is an increasing trend in favour of short-term operating lease. 
For example, Gritta et al. (1994) reported that, for a sample of major US carriers, percentage 
of planes leased increased from 19% in 1969 to 54% in 1991 and the percentage of aircraft 
under operating leases to total leased aircraft increased from 13% in 1969 to 82% in 1991. 
The share of new aircraft acquired by operating lessors has increased from close to zero in the 
early 1980s to above 40% recently13. According to Ascend, an aviation consultancy14, leasing 
is actually more pronounced especially in Europe and Latin America. They state that even 
44% of aircraft in Europe are leased. As previously mentioned, Boeing expects that leasing 
will represent over half of worldwide fleet by 2020. In this thesis operating leases are being 
studied because of their dominating prevalence in capital financing of airlines. 
 
  
Graph 12. Historical growth of operating lease fleets. Source: Ascend. 
 
                                                
13 http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/emptys/102389/aircraft-finance-2013.pdf, retrieved 
2.3.2013 
14 http://www.ascendworldwide.com/Ascend-OperatingLessorAnalysis_Q4-2010.pdf, retrieved 2.3.2013 
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Boeing estimates that there are currently 
over 150 lessors in the world and more 
than 700 customers in some 140 
countries around the globe. Ascend 
describes that the amount of lessors has 
doubled in recent twenty years. However, 
the  industry  is  led  by  only  few  large  
players. The pioneer in aircraft leasing, 
ILFC, together with another huge lessor 
GECAS are clearly dominating the 
market with a combined market share of 
about one third. Ascend continues that 
historically top 5 lessors have controlled 
about half of the leased fleet. Moreover, 
economist Paul Sheridan from Ascend 
notes that of the world's four largest 
owners of airliners, two are lessors. 
GECAS  has  a  fleet  of  1,732  planes  and  
ILFC 1,031. The biggest airline at time of 
the article measured with fleet size was 
Delta, which owned “only” 800 aircraft.15 In this kind of market, the experience, outlook, 
market power and purchase power of leasing companies is clear.  
In Airline Fleet Management’s January – February issue16, Bill Collins, VP for leasing and 
asset management sales at Boeing, reasons for this increasing popularity of leases. According 
to him, the main reason is the low profitability of airlines, thus finding them hard to purchase 
an  aircraft  outright.  He  explains  that  airlines  are  trying  to  maintain  liquidity  and  keep  their  
liabilities off their balance sheets. As leasing holds capital costs down, it is most appealing to 
capital constrained airlines. He also reluctantly admits that highly experienced lessors have 
become market experts and airlines appreciate this increased consultant role of leasing 
companies. Collins clarifies that lessors are nowadays actually financing companies with 
better and cheaper access to financing. This is what makes them more profitable than airlines, 
                                                
15 http://www.economist.com/node/21543195, retrieved 1.10.2012 
16 http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/8477a87d?page=1#/8477a87d/41, retrieved 25.2.2013 
Graph 13. Top 10 aircraft lessors by fleet value. 
Source: Flightglobal 
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continues previously mentioned Kostya Zolotusky. Zolotusky continues that because 
commercial lenders will focus more and more on better rated customers, many airlines are 
unable to purchase aircraft and therefore the leasing business will grow even faster. The 
Boeing executive also stresses the importance of airline’s own long-term desires when 
considering lease-versus-purchase question. Many airlines are beginning to think that it may 
be better to someone else to own the assets, treat them as investments and bear the associated 
risks. The drawback of leasing is of course tightened cash flows because of all airplane 
utilization and rent payments. So, owning an aircraft produces cash-flow flexibility but in 
order to gain from the owning, airline needs to make profit to have the taxation benefits. 
Dick Forsberg17, a head of strategy of an aircraft lessor, is in line with Zolotusky and says that 
aircraft leasing is far more profitable and less risky business than airline business itself. He 
explains how lessors are less exposed to external variations directly and because of long-term 
agreements their cash flow is more stable. However, lessors do expose themselves to credit 
quality of their customers, airlines. Forsberg continues how despite volatility of air transport 
industry during past twenty years aircraft leasing companies have experienced relatively low 
fluctuation in their profitability and returns. 
IATA regards the sharp decrease of lease rates in recent years, particularly for larger aircraft, 
the most influential reason for the lease popularity.18 They continue that while interest  rates 
remain low, also the lease rates are attractive. IATA states that also delays of new Airbus and 
Boeing widebodies have contributed to growth of leasing as airlines are forced to enter into 
substitutive leasing agreements as a temporary solution. Indeed, the market have seen 
exceptional amount of sale and leasebacks. Those agreements benefit both airlines and lessors 
as former improves cash flow while the latter avoids pre-delivery payments and additional 
costs, states IATA. Also Finnair has entered into four financial leasing agreements, all of with 
the Airbus A330 aircraft. 
CIT, corporate aircraft lessor, and Forbes carried out a survey of almost 136 airline executive 
around the world in 2010. In their survey over half of the respondents said that they lease 
more  than  50%  of  their  fleets.19 Interestingly, and on contrary, Finnair has announced that 
their strategy is to own more than a half of their fleet.20 The strategy is in line with the current 
                                               
17 http://www.aviationfinance.aero/articles/11510/Leasing-can-provide-an-attractive-investment-opportunity-for-
long-term-equity-investors%3A-Forsberg., retrieved 9.10.2012 
18 http://www.iata.org/publications/airlines-international/august-2010/Pages/07a.aspx, retrieved 9.10.2012 
19 http://catsr.ite.gmu.edu/SYST660/CIT_Aircraft_Leasing_Industry_Overview.pdf, retrieved 9.10.2012 
20 http://www.finnairgroup.com/linked/en/downloads/Finnair_IR_November_2012.pdf, retrieved 4.3.2013 
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situation as Finnair owns 66% of their fleet. The fleet is covered more thoroughly in next sub-
chapter. 
A curiosity from the academic world is the study of Bazargan and Hartman (2012), where 
they  develop  a  model  for  aircraft  replacement  strategy  for  both  small  low  cost  carrier  with  
narrow fleet and major airline with diversified fleet. They find that regardless of the airline 
network size and fleet diversity the suggestion is same: prefer leasing over purchasing, prefer 
short-term leases, discourage fleet diversity and sell over 12 years old aircraft. This strongly 
speaks for behalf of leasing as a strong preference in today’s aviation world. This is in line 
with the findings of Oum et. al (2000) who consider leasing as an important tool for the 
modern airline industry 
Despite the many optimistic predictions, the leasing market hasn’t come clear just yet, writes 
AirFinance Journal in August 2012.21 Lease rates are pretty unstable and quite low at the 
moment, clearly lower than before 2007. Paper suggests that this is due to a combination of 
low interest levels, depreciation of aircraft values and low profit margins. The cost of debt is 
rising and pushing rates up but at the same time lessor competition will hold rates down. Also 
recent quite large acquisitions among the largest lessors may have an impact. There is also a 
great variation in rates between the aircraft types. Michael Inglese, Chief Financial Officer at 
Aircastle, says that the rates for narrowbodies have held up well over the past year. 
Widebodies struggle more but actually A330 seems to be returned to lease rate levels of 2007 
due to high demand and lack of availability in the market. Especially in Asia, the demand for 
larger aircraft is indisputable. 
Now, in the revival from the recent financial crisis, the world economy has rebounded and 
there has been a strong and rapid recovery among the aircraft lessors. More and more lessors 
are purchasing aircrafts from the manufacturers after a slower business cycle compared to 
airlines purchasing aircrafts directly themselves. In addition, the leasing market environment 
has changed during the crisis and several new players have entered the market. As conditions 
in the market continue to be uncertain, it may be that leasing companies emphasize 
increasingly creditworthy airlines in their customer selection. According to IATA, lessors are 
also looking to raise the security deposit and the maintenance reserve. Overall, leasing 
companies are generally reaching good profits, a trend that seems to continue. This increased 
role of the lessors emphasizes the highly topical question related to aircraft financing. 
                                               
21 2012 OPERATING LEASE SURVEY. Airfinance Journal. Jul/Aug2012, p1-1., retrieved 1.10.2012 
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Increased importance of aircraft leases in airline business clearly states that the debate of buy 
versus lease is going to become more and more relevant. Next sub-chapter will present the 
case company, Finnair. 
2.2 Presentation of the case company 
This section presents briefly the case company. It  will  start  by describing the outlook of the 
company today and tomorrow. It will also take a look back and review the results and major 
events in 2012. This is followed by a presentation of Finnair’s current fleet and how the 
aircraft financing is managed. Finally, the capital budgeting practices used are being 
discussed. 
2.2.1 Finnair in 2013 – Strategy and outlook 
Finnair is one of world's oldest continually operating airlines. The company was founded 
already in 1923 so Finnair will be celebrating its 90th anniversary in 2013. Finnair is for the 
most part state-owned. Although always being eager for long-haul expansion, Finnair was for 
a long time a basic point-to-point airline serving both domestic and European routes. Of 
course, in addition Finnair has for a long time had also broad long-haul coverage but not until 
past ten years the whole ideology is turned upside down and almost the whole fleet is actually 
harnessed to serve the Asian expansion. Now the role of the European flights are not just to 
bring Finnish people back home as it used to but to bring people from Europe to Helsinki and 
further to Asia and vice versa. 
Indeed, in recent years, a key part of Finnair's strategy has been strengthening the company's 
position in the Asian market and particularly in traffic between Europe and Asia. Today, 
Finnair has been able to establish a solid position in traffic to Asia. This is heavily supported 
by the Finland’s favourable geographical location. The shortest great circle route from Europe 
to Asia passes through Helsinki. This brings a clear competitive advantage. Finnair is 
currently operating scheduled flights to 12 long-haul destinations: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, 
Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Delhi, Seoul, Singapore and New 
York.22 In summer 2013 Finnair will also introduce nonstop flights to Xian and Hanoi. The 
dominance of Asian destinations is clear. Finnair reports that the Asian share of the total 
capacity is already 49.8% while contributing to 45% of total passenger revenue at the end of 
                                               
22 http://www.finnairgroup.com/linked/en/konserni/Finnair_Financial_report_2012.pdf, retrieved 8.3.2013 
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year 2012. The weekly frequency of Asian flights is, depending on the season, about 70 
flights. In Asia, Finnair is the 3rd largest carrier in its destinations and has an estimated 
market share of 5.9% on those routes. 
 
Graph 14. Finnair’s passenger revenue split in Q3 2012. Source: Finnair. 
 
About 20 million passengers travel annually on the Finnair’s Europe-Asia routes which makes 
this globally one of the fastest growing traffic areas. In addition, the traffic between Europe 
and China is forecasted to triple during the next 30 year as Airbus forecasts. Finnair’s core 
strategy is specifically based on this expected growth in Asia by providing the fastest 
connections between Europe and Asia, with high-quality service. Finnair strives to retain its 
reputation as one of the most punctual and safe airlines in the industry. Finnair will focus 
particularly in the fast growing Asian economies and to those European cities that do not 
provide direct connections to Asia. As Finnair states in its newest financial report, the growth 
of one percentage point in travel between Europe and Asia would mean approximately 
200,000 potential new passengers annually. Airbus has forecasted that the expected annual 
growth would be 4.1% annually to 2031, measured by revenue passenger kilometres (CAGR). 
To Finnair, this naturally means excellent opportunities for growth. 
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Figure 1. Finnair’s route structure in 2013. Source: Finnair. 
 
Next, I will take a quick glance at year 2012 and review the key factors influencing where the 
company stands currently. 2012 Finnair finally returned to profit after four consecutive years 
of losses. Improved unit revenues and a successful cost-reduction program have definitely 
contributed to this. Finnair succeeded in increasing its turnover by 8.5% to 2,449.4 million 
euros while at  the same time the profitability improved, resulting to an operational result  of 
44.9 million euros. In 2012 Finnair was one of the best companies in the industry in terms of 
unit revenue development. The renewed revenue management and pricing made an impact 
and Finnair over-performed its competitors in unit revenue growth during the first half of the 
year.23 Unit revenues of the full year improved by a record-breaking 7.7 percentages. This 
was achieved as both passenger load factor (PLF) and yield per revenue passenger kilometre 
(RPK yield) improved simultaneously.24 
Being a traditional and long-serving airline has definitely both pros and cons.  Of course the 
company culture is very strong and for example safety-orientation can be regarded as a self-
evident truth. However, there are also downsides, one of which is the heavy cost structure. 
                                                
23 http://www.finnairgroup.com/linked/en/downloads/04_CMD_Pete_031212_FINAL.pdf, retrieved 4.3.2013 
24 http://www.finnairgroup.com/linked/en/downloads/05_CMD_Erno_031212_FINAL.pdf, retrieved 4.3.2013 
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Traditional airlines are built quite differently than for example low cost carriers. Also Finnair 
has been forced to restructure its businesses many times along the way as the environment 
constantly changes. In 2011 Finnair launched a structural change and cost-reduction program 
which aims to cumulated savings of 140 million euros by the end of 2013. By the end of 
2012, already 100 million euros of permanent and annual savings were achieved. However, 
during 2012 Finnair introduced an additional cost-cutting program of 60 million euros to 
further improve the profitability and to ensure the future fleet investments. Finnair’s CEO 
Mika Vehviläinen states that additional cost reductions are absolutely necessary to achieve 
sustainable profitability needed to finance the Airbus A350 investments. Those investments 
are, needless to say, vital for Finnair to be competitive in the future. 
One  of  the  major  events  in  2012  related  to  restructuring  were  the  transfer  of  European  
Embraer traffic to Flybe Finland Oy, a Finnish subsidiary of British Flybe and Finnair, with a 
contract flying-agreement. This means that the commercial control over the routes and the 
risk remain with Finnair. Flybe was already in charge of Finnair’s domestic flights. Other 
restructurings were related to technical services and catering. 
 
 
Graph 15. Finnair’s debt ratios and cash flows. Source: Finnair. 
 
Finnair has a strong financial position, which supports future investments. The company’s net 
cash flow from operating activities was 154.7 million euros in 2012, a clear improvement to 
last year's corresponding figure. The balance sheet also strengthened during 2012. The equity 
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ratio was 35.7%, gearing 17.6% and adjusted gearing 76.8%. At the end of the period under 
review, interest-bearing debt amounted to 569.0 million euros. Also the liquidity remained 
good in 2012. The company’s cash funds amounted to 430.5 million euros and in addition the 
company has the option for re-borrowing employment pension fund reserves worth 
approximately 430 million euros from its employment pension insurance company. Finnair 
also has funding available through an entirely unused 200 million Euro syndicated credit 
agreement, which will mature in June 2013. Finnair’s assets and liabilities are visualized in 
the graph below. More Finnair key figures can be found in APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. 
 
Graph 16. Finnair’s asset and liabilities. Source: Finnair. 
 
Vehviläinen explains the Finnair’s vision and condenses it to three main points. First, Finnair 
is striving to double its revenue from Asian traffic by 2020 compared with the level of 2010. 
Second, the company has set a goal to be the most desired option in traffic between Asia and 
Europe and among the third largest airlines on routes between Asia and Europe where 
passengers have to change planes.  Third,  Finnair  also wants to be the number one airline in 
the Nordic countries and at the same time grow in this home market. 25 
                                                
25 http://www.finnairgroup.com/linked/en/downloads/01_CMD_Mika_1_031212_FINAL.pdf, retrieved 4.3.2013 
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According to Vehviläinen, this is done by focusing on core airline business in both scheduled 
long and short haul traffic, in leisure traffic and in cargo traffic. Profitability needs to be 
improved by improving operational efficiency, cutting costs and changing cost structure and 
by increasing revenues. He concludes that Finnair’s strengths are a clear strategy, competitive 
advantage because of geographical location, modern, fuel-efficient fleet, high-class service, 
operational quality and efficiency, quality and capacity of Helsinki-Vantaa Airport and good 
financing position for implementing future fleet investments. 
As Finnair states in one of its presentations26, the company needs to change along with the 
environment to remain competitive. This is recently done for example by optimizing the 
narrowbody fleet. Nine aircraft have been totally removed from service and several lease 
agreements have been renegotiated with multiple Airbus lessors. Also route planning and 
aircraft utilization have improved with the help of new network forecasting and fleet planning 
tools.  In addition, new partnerships are improving cost efficiency and flexibility. For example 
Flybe Finland provides a lower cost base for turboprops and small jets. 
As previously reviewed the outlook in Europe remains challenging and uncertain. The traffic 
is  expected  to  grow in  moderation  and  jet  fuel  prices  will  most  probably  remain  high.  This  
will set up a difficult environment but Finnair estimates that it will increase its turnover in 
2013. The company also expects that unit cost excluding fuel will decrease and operational 
result will be in profit. 
2.2.2 Current fleet and aircraft financing 
Finnair has one of the most modern fleets in the world. The average age of the fleet is about 
ten years and long-haul fleet about seven years. The fleet consists of narrowbody aircraft 
which fly domestic and European scheduled and leisure flights and widebody aircraft 
purposed to long-haul routes. Finnair’s fleet is managed by Finnair Aircraft Finance Oy, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Finnair Plc. At the end of 2012, Finnair itself operated 45 
aircraft, of which 15 are wide-body and 30 narrow-body aircraft. In addition to the aircraft 
operated by Finnair, its balance sheet includes 24 aircraft owned by the company and 
operated by other airlines, mainly by Flybe Finland. Finnair also has eight leased aircraft, 
which it has subleased and which are operated by other airlines. At the end of year 2012, two 
thirds of the fleet operated by Finnair was owned by the company while the remaining third 
                                               
26 http://www.finnairgroup.com/linked/en/downloads/03_CMD_Greg_031212_FINAL.pdf, retrieved 4.3.2013 
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were leased. The main purpose of this diversification of ownership according to Finnair is the 
management of residual value risk of the aircraft.  
 
 
Table 1. Finnair’s fleet on 31 Dec 2012. Source: Finnair. 
 
The fleet operated by Finnair was reduced by an over-whelming twenty aircraft in total during 
2012. Finnair transferred the traffic of its Embraer 190 aircraft to be operated by Flybe 
Finland Oy. This affected twelve aircraft. Additionally, the company received one ATR 
aircraft that is now leased to Flybe. Nine aircraft were additionally eliminated from the fleet 
when Finnair gave up four Airbus 32S series aircraft after the end of their leasing agreements 
and subleased four Embraer 170 aircraft to Estonian Air. Further, the company leased one 
Embraer 170 aircraft through a wet lease agreement to Honeywell for a year. It is noteworthy 
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that because of recent fleet restructurings, the share of owned aircraft has increased from 59% 
last year to previously mentioned 66% today. This is typical in insecure times in Finnair as 
during credit crisis Finnair took all the widebody aircraft into its balance sheet.27  
Finnair has several alternatives for financing their aircraft in addition to purchasing them. 28 
Funding sources available for aircraft investments are both asset backed loans and bonds, 
export credit and (Japanese) operating lease. As can be seen many of these are secured by 
aircraft as collateral. Today’s trend seems to be that also operating leases need an asset 
security (Scheinberg, 2010). In asset backed financing, the asset, in this case aircraft, 
functions as collateral. Common loan to values are 70-100% depending on the vehicle 
meaning that down payments amount from zero to about 30%. As previously reviewed in the 
current market outlook section, the government backed export credit is expected to lose its 
appeal because of new regulations making it more expensive. As also mentioned, capital 
markets are expected to source aircraft financing even more than before and that’s why asset 
backed bonds may gain some popularity. Also Finnair has participated in capital markets as 
the company issued a hybrid bond loan of 120 million euros in 2012 and simultaneously 
repurchased 67.7 million worth of the 120 million hybrid loan issued in 2009.29 
Finnair is fairly well rated, so asset backed bonds may offer also some appealing alternatives. 
The company itself describes that the current state of credit market and Finnair’s good debt 
capacity enable the financing of future fixed-asset investments on competitive terms. Finnair 
has 31 unencumbered30 aircraft, whose balance sheet value corresponds to approximately 40% 
of the value of the entire fleet of 1.2 billion euros. This includes three finance lease aircraft. 
The number of unencumbered aircraft will increase to 36 by the end of 2013. Detailed figures 
can be found in Appendix 2.  
However, the operating lease seems to be the trend today, especially when trying to diversify 
the residual risk. Increased share of owned aircraft in Finnair’s fleet could encourage 
operating lease as a finance source. In the graph below left is illustrated all the lease 
commitments in Finnair, year by year. On the right are yearly operating lease liabilities of 
aircraft. In this graph, the annual lease rentals are multiplied by seven to achieve this figure. 
                                               
27 https://newsclient.omxgroup.com/cdsPublic/viewDisclosure.action?disclosureId=432730&lang=en, retrieved 
27.2.2013 
28 http://www.finnairgroup.com/linked/en/downloads/05_CMD_Erno_031212_FINAL.pdf, retrieved 4.3.2013 
29 https://newsclient.omxgroup.com/cdsPublic/viewDisclosure.action?disclosureId=529822&lang=en, retrieved 
4.3.2013 
30 Unencumbered =  the asset isn’t as collateral in any agreement and thus can be used as one in the future 
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This is a common method of capitalizing the liabilities in the industry and to maintain 
comparability, also Finnair uses this formula. The formula is based on an assumption that the 
current leases are renewed, so that the demand for aircraft in use remains constant. Actual 
lease liabilities are naturally lower than reported due to expiring agreements. 
 
Graph 17. Lease commitments and operating lease liabilities in Finnair. Source: Finnair. 
 
Finnair has, however, stated that in the long-run, owning aircraft is the most cost-efficient 
way to finance their fleet. Nat Pieper from Delta agrees.31 He argues that big airlines are 
better off buying planes and keeping them for their full lifespan of 30 years or so. He reasons 
that like many other expensive commodities, buying is cheaper than renting in the long term. 
He fears that the growth and profitability of the aircraft-leasing business is actually a 
reflection of how short term the airline business has become. However, Finnair continues that 
their strategy is to own over 50% of their core fleet, an objective fulfilled at the moment. The 
company emphasizes that various sources and instruments are used for financing to ensure the 
lowest possible cost of financing and the best possible operational flexibility and continuity. 
Finnair explains that fleet investments are usually done through secured financing, unsecured 
loans are then used for refinancing and flexibility. Sources of financing could be commercial 
paper program of €200 million, which has 61 million euros outstanding or revolving credit 
facility of 200 million euros which expires in Q2/2013 and is unutilized at the moment. Other 
                                                
31 http://www.economist.com/node/21543195, retrieved 1.10.2012 
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potential funding sources could be non-core fleet sale and leasebacks, asset optimization, 
pension loan or senior unsecured bond. 
According to Finnair, fleet renewal is an essential part in a successful strategy 
implementation. This is justified with reduced unit costs and improved fuel efficiency. In first 
phase in 2008-2010 MD11 fleet was replaced with Airbus 330/340 aircraft. The second phase 
was carried out in 2012 as 9 aircraft were reduced from European fleet and Embraer traffic 
was transferred to Flybe. The third phase is to be initiated during 2013-2014 when Boeing 
757 fleet is going to be replaced with Airbus A321 ERs. The fourth and currently final phase 
from is scheduled to start in the second half of 2015 as Airbus 350 XWB aircraft arrive. They 
will partly replace current A340s and partly increase capacity. As a result, this harmonized 
Airbus fleet brings asset and crew utilization benefits. Overall, Finnair has very modern and 
quite consistent fleet. The company has the possibility to adjust the size of its fleet flexibly 
according to demand and outlook due to its lease agreements with different durations. 
2.2.3 Financing decision analysis in Finnair 
Currently financing decisions are being evaluated with a method where an implicit interest 
rate for a lease agreement is calculated. In other words, this implicit interest means a 
computational interest induced by leasing costs. More explicitly, it is an internal rate of return 
of the net cash flow of an equivalent debt with a certain advance rate. The implicit interest 
rate is then compared to the current cost of senior secured debt. This calculation takes an 
estimated residual value into account. What this method lacks is the comparison of actual 
cash flows of costs. Because of the one-sidedness of the analysis, it would be good that also 
other methods would be used. Therefore, I will make calculations using the NPV method and 
the APV together with Monte Carlo simulation. 
2.3 Acquisition of Airbus A330-300 
At the moment Finnair has a widebody fleet of 15 aircraft, eight Airbus A330’s and seven 
A340’s. Airbus A330’s are a part of Finnair’s long-haul traffic fleet modernization as they 
replaced long served MD-11’s. A330 fleet had an average age of only 3.2 years at the end of 
year 2012. A330 flew its maiden flight already in 1994 but have seen several further 
developments since. The plane represented the latest technology in the widebody category for 
pretty long time but is now overtaken by more economical and technologically advanced 
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Boeing 787, launched finally in 2011. Airbus will respond with their brand new A350 extra-
widebody which should be entering into service during 2015. In Finnair, A330 is used in 
shorter long-haul routes such as New York, Seoul, Delhi, and Nagoya. Among airlines A330 
is considered to be very cost efficient with low operating costs per seat. It also has good cargo 
capacity and as a whole offers excellent operational flexibility. With total of 622 orders up to 
date A330-300 is Airbus’ best-selling widebody. The A330-300 can carry more passengers 
than the B787, is cheaper and is more readily available.32  
When new aircraft types are launched, which occurs usually in about 20 year cycles, the 
values of older models in same category naturally tend to decrease. At the moment in the 
widebody category Boeing is on the verge of launching their new 787 Dreamliner to the 
market while their existing model 777 is still being produced with increasing rates. 
Meanwhile Airbus is producing both A330 and A340 types and the scheduled introduction of 
their newest widebody A350 is in the year of 2013. Naturally both manufacturers are now 
promoting the sales of their existing flagships but the risk of increased depreciation in the 
future is imminent. The production rates are thus high but the demand for widebody aircraft is 
still limited. The aftermarket of those aircraft can be challenging in the future. Indeed, smaller 
narrowbody aircraft are a lot more liquid than their larger counterparts. My data provider, the 
Aircraft Valuation Analysis Company, describes the current market as stable than before but 
at the same time mentions weakness of the global economy and fragility of the aviation 
industry. This can be seen as slightly negative effect on the current and short term market 
values of aircraft.  However,  it  must be stated that although the market of used aircraft  have 
slowed in general, A330-300 have regained the 2007 values and lease rates as previously 
mentioned.33 The demand for A330-300 is solid and the scarcity of the aircraft pushes the 
values and rates up. 
The popularity of A330 has been increasing ever since its launch. The aircraft seems to fit in 
the fleets of almost 100 hundred operators as the aircraft is considered very versatile and 
flexible. Also continuous improvements applied by Airbus to its jetliner result in lower costs 
and better operations for the A330-300. This would supposed to have a positive impact on the 
popularity.  These advancements range from weight reductions in the airframe to introduction 
of modern passenger cabin features and form system improvements to engine upgrades and 
advanced navigation systems in the cockpit.  They also result in longer maintenance check 
                                               
32 "Widebody Values Could Gain From Growth." Aircraft Value News 22, no. 3: 5. Business Source Complete, 
EBSCOhost , retrieved 5.3.2013 
33 2012 Operating lease survey. Airfinance Journal. Jul/Aug2012, p1-1., retrieved 1.10.2012 
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intervals.34 A330-300 is a good choice in Finnair’s harmonized Airbus fleet because of 
lowered utilization costs of personnel and maintenance. 
According to Aircraft Finance Guide, the global A330 fleet has an average age of less than 
seven years. This means that the majority of in-service aircraft are still with their original 
airline operators. Over 1,000 A330 passenger aircraft have been sold and more than 750 are in 
service with 95 operators. According to Ascend, only 10 A330s are in storage today, which 
reflects low supply. Airbus A330 has also been a very popular aircraft among the operating 
lessors. They actually manage 44% of the fleet currently in service. This is a high percentage 
and carries the risk that airlines may choose to manage capacity in future downturns by 
simply not renewing leases as they expire. As so many airlines have ordered either B787 or 
A350XWB, the threat to A330 residual values is clear. Despite all the cautions arisen by these 
issues, the fact remains that for many routes, the A330s are the most efficient aircraft of their 
size available today, and apparently for many years to come. According to Aircraft Finance 
Guide, it will take a long time before some new competitive model has sufficient amount of 
aircraft in the market. The 787-8 is set to be the first new aircraft to threaten the A330 but it 
could be 2017 before sufficient numbers of them are in service. The larger B787-9 and 
A350XWB-900 are not likely to reach sufficient numbers until perhaps as late as 2020, 
meaning that the threat to A330-300 values are likely to be lower.35 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
34 http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/a330family/a330-300/, retrieved 2.3.2013 
35 Aircraft Finance Guide 2012, UBM Aviation, http://edition.pagesuite-
professional.co.uk/launch.aspx?pnum=6&eid=1607145a-5fa1-4ac4-aae9-e66ea4abee12, retrieved 2.3.2013 
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Graph 18. Development of A330 share of all widebodies. 
 
This study is built around a hypothetical acquisition of a new Airbus A330-300 aircraft in the 
beginning of the year 2013. My purpose is to study particularly the financing decision of the 
acquisition not the investment decision. However, one can draw conclusions about the role of 
the possible new A330 aircraft. As Finnair states in their financial report 2012, the company 
is evaluating alternative to minimize the effect of possible delays on deliveries of A350.  So, 
the acquisition of A330 would most probably be a temporary alternative due to delays or 
alternatively because of sudden increase in demand of long-haul routes. Because of Finnair’s 
reliance on the success of long-haul operations between Europe and Asia, the need for fuel-
efficient and modern widebody aircraft is undisputable. 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first one presents briefly few necessary 
definitions. The second section introduces the most relevant existing literature to date by first 
presenting the investment analysis with different methods and their benefits and challenges. 
Then the use of these methods in airline business is reviewed. Finally, few words about 
specific challenges of the estimation of the cost of capital and residual values are spoken. The 
third section explains tax and accounting treatment of leases more thoroughly. 
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3.1 Definitions 
Based on International Accounting Standards (IAS 17)36 established by International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB): “leasing is an agreement that gave the landlord to the 
tenant,  in  exchange  for  payment  of  a  lump  sum  of  money,  or  a  series  of  payments  or  
contributions, the right to use an asset over a period of time.” Leases come in many forms but 
the basic idea is always the same. The lessee (user) makes a series of payments to the lessor 
(owner) for using an asset. Leasing is hence a source of financing. The leasing period can 
cover the whole estimated life of the equipment or it can be only a short term like is often the 
case with the aircraft leasing. Leasing agreements often contain options like options to 
purchase the asset or extend the lease. Leases can be cancellable, include services and the 
ownership of the asset can be passed on at the end of an agreement. So, by now it is clear that 
there is a need to define some basic terms used in this study. 
Mainly it is important to make a distinction between two kinds of leases. Generally leases can 
be divided to financial lease and operating lease based on certain characteristics of the 
financial contract. According to IAS 17 in financial lease all risks and rewards of ownership 
of assets are transferred substantially to the lessee. If not, a lease is classified as operating 
lease. Basically the main difference between financial and operating lease is that the 
ownership and usage of the asset are being separated in the operating lease in a way that the 
ownership of the asset will not transfer to the lessee at the end of a contract. On the other hand 
financial lease can be seen a more debt-like financing instrument with periodical payments 
and at the end the asset transfer to the lessee.  
Operating leases have a few distinct features over their financial counterparts that should be 
mentioned. First, an operating lease is generally much shorter than the actual life of the asset 
and therefore the present value of the lease payments is usually lower than the actual price of 
the asset. Second, at the end of an agreement the asset reverts back to the lessor who then re-
leases or sells the asset. This means that the residual value risk, aroused from the difference of 
the forecasted and the actual value of the asset at the end of the lease, is borne by the lessor. 
This is one of the fundamentals of operating leases and could be one of the explanatory 
factors for the increased popularity of operating leases in aviation business. Third, an 
operating lease can be seen as a hybrid of financing and investing because a lease rental 
                                               
36 A revised standard replaces IAS 17 (revised 1997) Leases, and will apply for annual 
periods beginning on or after January 1, 2005. 
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contains both financing and operating cash flows. These are: capital cost of depreciating the 
asset, implicit interest charge for financing the asset and the cost of risk transfer. (Gibson and 
Morrell, 2004) 
This thesis focuses mainly on operating leases due to their more common use, and increasing 
trend, in aviation leasing in general and especially in the case company. In fact it is estimated 
that  about  80%  (Gritta  et  al.,  1994)  of  all  commercial  airliner  leasing  agreements  are  
operating leases. Out of about 30 leasing contracts in Finnair, only 3 of them represent a true 
financial lease and are therefore dealt as debt. So, the overwhelming majority is operating 
leases and the choice of focus is therefore justified. The popularity of the leases will be 
covered more thoroughly in industry overview in chapter 2. 
In general, a financial lease is more traditional and widely-used and therefore also more often 
studied in the leasing literature. That can also be due to a fact that definitions have been a 
little bit different in the past. Even in studies published in early 1980’s the term operating 
lease referred to a lease that was cancellable. If it wasn’t the right term to use was a financial 
lease. That’s what makes it essential to clarify these definitions used in this study. So today, 
operating lease is a lease where all risks and rewards related to ownership of asset are not 
transferred to the lessee. 
3.2 Accounting and tax treatment discrepancies 
Because one of the justifications for a lease contract lies in their accounting and tax treatment, 
it is necessary to cover their basics. This subsection summarizes different accounting and tax 
practices from the lessee’s perspective. First current practices are introduced and then the 
effect of proposed changes in international accounting standards is explained. Both widely-
used IFRS and Finnish national accounting standards are covered. And although this thesis 
focuses on operating leases, to understand the incentive to use operating leasing rather than 
financial it is good to recognize differences in their treatment. 
In Finland, listed companies are obliged to comply with IFRS standards. Previously 
mentioned IFRS standard IAS 17 states that financial leases have to be reported in the balance 
sheet as equivalent ownership of the asset and the lease obligations should be capitalized and 
shown on the liability side. On contrary, lease payments under an operating lease shall be 
recognized as a rental expense in income statement over the lease term and the future 
payments are disclosed only in the footnotes. This is the reason why operating leases are 
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sometimes referred as non-balance sheet financing.  When off-balance sheet financing is 
obtained, the market value of company is increased due to the investment but financial 
leverage measures like debt-equity ratio or gearing can be distorted by understating the true 
degree of leverage. Other effects on key figures are that the volatility of earnings is increased 
because of fixed lease payments and the return on investment increases. However, to increase 
transparency many companies report adjusted ratios like adjusted gearing which takes into 
account the leasing liabilities. Many authors, including Brealey and Myers (2003), consider 
off-balance sheet characteristic as a dubious reason for leasing because they believe that 
financial analysts are not foolish enough to miss the relevant information in the footnotes. 
From the lessee point of view national accounting regulations37 in Finland do not distinguish 
the treatment of operating and financial leases. Therefore the lessee does not recognize leases 
in their balance sheet but payments are shown as rental expenses in income statement and 
nominal values of future payments are disclosed in the footnotes.  
What makes this topic current in the terms of accounting are the proposed changes to 
international accounting standards by IASB and FASB. When implemented in 2013, the new 
standards will especially impact on operating leases because according to the proposals all 
leases will need to be recorded on balance sheet as the present value of the “right-to-use” 
asset and a corresponding liability. This means that there will be no more a distinction 
between financial and operating lease and no more off-balance sheet possibilities. 
Furthermore lease payments will be treated as a finance cost rather than an operating rental 
expense as today. Finance cost will also comprise amortization on the right to use and interest 
on the liability. Also contingent rentals, like options to extend, must be taken into account 
when determining the lease term for present value calculations. Rating agencies and financial 
analysts already adjust for operating leases so there might not be any significant change in 
their valuations, unless their previous estimates were inaccurate or they see indebtedness 
differently. The most affected key figures are increased EBITDA, gearing and operating cash 
flow while EPS and interest cover are decreased.  
The tax treatment of leases is considered one of the major reasons why some companies 
should rather lease than purchase an asset. While all lease payments are fully tax deductible, 
having debt only allows deducting interest payments of debt. Therefore to gain same tax 
benefit than with leasing, one should have a substantially larger claim and that would 
consequently lead to higher agency costs due to increased risk of insolvency. However, what 
                                               
37 Accounting Ordinance 30.12.1997/1339 
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balances the margin is the fact that depreciations of a purchased asset can be deducted from 
the taxable income. As financial leases are treated like debt, their amortization is deducted 
from the book income. However, one should remember that only profitable companies can 
benefit from these tax shields. 
3.3 Related literature 
This chapter introduces previous academic literature related to the topic and observes the 
issue from the both financial and less financial perspective. First the elementary leasing 
literature from the 1970’s including investments analysis or in other words capital budgeting 
is reviewed. This includes a description of the most popular investment valuation methods 
and their characteristics. This is followed by a review of the non-tax incentives to lease. Then 
flexibility and other reasons why airlines lease are being reviewed. I also wanted to 
emphasize two challenging variables related to valuation of aircraft leases by creating 
separate sub-sectors for the cost of capital and residual value. Chapter continues by discussing 
about the popularity of different valuation methods in actual airline valuation practices. Also 
the lease-debt substitutability will be briefly opened up. 
3.3.1 The birth of leasing valuation 
Leasing has existed in some form for centuries but what we currently understand as leasing 
saw a resurrection and a rather fast gain of popularity in post-war rapid growth period. 
Leasing has been a popular financing source since but still there hasn’t been introduced any 
comprehensive theory or model to answer the question whether an asset should be leased or 
purchased. Brealey and Myers (2003) offer an answer: “Buy if equivalent annual cost of 
ownership and operation is less than the best lease rate you can get from an outsider”. While 
true, in real life this is unfortunately rarely very simple task. 
The relevant academic literature related to leasing originated in early 1970’s and is based on 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theorems which have formed the basis for modern thinking on 
capital structure.  Their basic assumption is that in efficient market where taxes, agency costs, 
bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information do not exist, the capital structure is irrelevant to 
the value of the company. Of course this does not happen in real life but this basic theory is 
the basis of the capital budgeting analysis even today. 
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In early seventies academic society was bubbling over with leasing related studies while the 
definitions and acceptable theories sought for acceptance. Earlier capital budgeting methods 
were very primitive like simple but undeniably straightforward payback period (PBK) which 
calculates when the investment will be paid off and ARR (accounting rate of return) which 
calculates the return based on book values. These methods lacked the time value of money 
which was considered ever more important. It was then time for discounted cash flow (DCF) 
measures like net present value (NVP) which calculates the present value of an investment by 
discounting relevant cash flows to present day or internal rate of return (IRR) which 
determines the cost of capital when net present value is zero.  
Since the Modigliani-Miller model and its correction with taxes (1963), the finance literature 
has analysed the leasing decision in that framework. It recognizes taxes and bankruptcy and 
financial distress costs so that the optimal capital structure lies somewhere where they cross. 
The basic ground work for constantly evolving leasing literature was laid by the three articles 
all published in the same number of the Journal of Finance in 1976. Miller and Upton (1976) 
study particularly operating leasing versus purchase question from the tax point of view and 
find that the valuation of leases differs from valuation of purchase because of differences in 
the tax treatment. They also point out that many companies are unable to capitalize on the tax 
benefits  because  of  low  profitability  that  is  they  do  not  necessarily  pay  taxes.  This  is  
emphasized with aircraft leasing due to low profitability in airline business. 
Traditionally the main benefits of leasing are believed to arise from the different taxations 
between a lessor and a lessee. Myers, Dill and Bautista (MDB, 1976) examine the financial 
lease versus debt financing under the Modigliani and Miller environment (where a company 
is indifferent between leasing and buying if no tax differential exist) and state that the tax 
differential is the most important reason for existence of lease. A lessee with a lower marginal 
tax rate can transfer the tax benefit from the depreciation to the lessor with higher tax rate. 
Consequently the lessor compensates this benefit by offering lowered lease rates and both 
parties will benefit from this arrangement. Benefits can also be possible even though marginal 
tax rates were same for both. That is the case when a lessee cannot capitalize on the tax 
benefit of ownership presently for instance due to low profits but can transfer it to the lessor 
who can have a definite benefit. Situation is identical when the capitalization of tax benefit in 
the future is insecure. Lewellen, Long and McConnell (1976) also find the taxes to be the 
prime inventive for leases.  
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Above-mentioned MDB present the basic valuation model for leases by using the most 
common discounted cash flow technique today, net present value technique initially proposed 
in the 1960’s. The method simply discounts all the relevant cash flows to the present with the 
firm’s borrowing rate, usually WACC. WACC was first introduced by Modigliani & Miller in 
their proposition II in 1958. When applied to leasing from the lessee point of view, the 
acquisition price is the positive cash flow because not having to pay the price when leased. 
Cash outflow is comprised of the present value of after-tax (tax deductible) lease payments, 
the present value of the opportunity cost of the lost depreciation tax shield and finally the 
present value of the change in the interest tax shield on debt that is displaced by the lease 
financing. If the present value is positive it indicates that company would be better off by 
leasing rather than buying the asset. Their model is widely-used today and many different 
variations and refines to their model have been introduced. Indeed, these 1976 studies were 
quickly followed by several other, also tax-based, researches like Franks and Hodges (1978) 
who brought MDB closer to practice and Brealey and Young (1980) who reminded that the 
preferred source of capital for a non-tax paying company is despite recent findings still 
equity. 
Johnson and Lewellen (1972) argue that lease-or-borrow decision is incorrect approach 
because the cash flows include also financing costs and the correct question should be rather 
lease-or-buy. Myer, Dill and Bautista (1976) however answer that lease-or-buy question is 
meaningless because a company can arrange transaction so that the question becomes 
irrelevant. They also emphasize that lease-or-borrow does not mean that a firm either leases 
or borrows the amount of purchase price of the asset. It simply means that when entered into 
leasing  agreement  a  firm reduces  its  ability  to  borrow from other  sources.  This  implies  that  
leasing displaces debt. Succeeding years refined the debate, operating and financing leases 
were more accurately defined and ‘lease vs. purchase’ problem was more clearly outlined as a 
‘lease vs. borrow’ question.  
However, related to operating leases this does not necessarily hold. As Gibson and Morrell 
(2004) point out it is not completely possible to distinguish investment and financing decision 
related to operating leases because operating lease payments include both implicit interest 
charge  for  financing  the  asset,  the  capital  cost  of  depreciating  aircraft  and  the  cost  of  risk  
transfer. Therefore there lies the risk of using NPV in aircraft investment analysis through the 
including operating cash flows in the analysis and comparing them against purchasing cash 
flows. Airlines view operating lease payments as operating costs while interest is presented 
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below the operating profit line. In practice however, lease payments include both investing 
and financing cash flows. Therefore they are actually implying that the analysis should 
include both investing and financing decision, a view very much contrary to Brealey and 
Myers (2003) and Copeland et al. (2005) Furthermore, when using weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) as a discount factor it emphasizes aircraft residual values and is therefore 
favourable to leasing because of the large initial investment. To overcome these challenges 
and  to  include  the  cost  of  the  residual  values  risk  transfer  to  valuation  process,  Gibson  and  
Morrell suggest using the well-documented method of adjusted present value (APV). Under 
APV, cash flows of different risk classes are discounted at the discount rates that reflect the 
risk  class  of  the  cash  flows.  In  practice  this  means  that  lease  and  debt  payments  are  
discounted with the cost of debt and investing and operating cash flows with the cost of 
equity. Authors emphasize that leasing is fundamentally a financing vehicle and should 
therefore be compared with the cost of debt. They consider an established practice of 
comparing operating lease cash flows and purchase cash flows together to be an incorrect 
method. Thus, they think that managers should compare financial cash flows to the ones of 
operating the aircraft.  This method takes into account the cost of leasing flexibility and the 
shareholder’s risk. The idea of APV first emerged when Schall (1974) stated that every 
distinct cash flow should be discounted with different rate. Then Myers (1974) introduced the 
basic version of APV which was then redeveloped by Myers et al. (1976). In the final version 
the main improvement for NPV was the consideration of the tax deductions on interest 
payments by discounting them with the cost of debt. Their basic idea of APV is that the NPV 
of the project is first calculated by discounting cash flows with the cost of equity, assuming 
thus all equity financing, and then “side-effects” of project are added. These side-effect cash 
flows may be discounted with the cost of debt because they can be seen as low risk. The 
benefit of APV is that it breaks the problem down into the value of the project itself (as it was 
equity financed) and the value of the financing. APV thus provides flexibility needed to 
investment analysis.  
Tax-based discussion about leases was resurrected in the 1990’s by Edwards and Mayer 
(1991) and Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) as latter study operating leases and 
support the existing view that firms with low tax rates tend to lease more. They also discover 
that firms with higher variability of earnings lease more. This could be particularly true in 
volatile aviation business. In support of their findings, Shanker (1999) comes to same 
conclusions that lower the marginal tax-rate, higher the use of leases. In this study a different 
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methodological approach is used in order to avoid the problematic of contingent rentals 
included in lease rentals. Sharpe and Ngyuen (1995) discover in their recognized study that 
companies with lower earnings to sales, lower credit ratings and smaller size, have higher 
operating lease share. Contrary to Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim, Erickson and Trevino 
(1994) suggest that high variability firms are renting less. They also find rare evidence for 
often mentioned tax motivations by receiving results that lease rentals are negatively 
correlated to the firm's tax status. They conclude their study by stating that operating leases 
are used by smaller firms, non-tax paying firms and firms experiencing more rapid sales 
growth. Incentive to lease has been traditionally been explained by taxes but there is more. 
The next sub-section will explain other incentives to lease. 
3.3.2 Lease valuation based on non tax-incentives 
During past two decades in academic literature this problematic and intriguing analysis about 
lease or buy decision in corporate finance has resurfaced quite intensively. Existing models 
and perspectives vary. Indeed in academic literature there are several new approaches 
compared to traditional leasing literature generated in the 1970’s. As they built the basis of 
the leasing literature by concentrating on the financial aspects like debt-like characteristic, tax 
benefits and off-balance sheet features increasing amount of attention has been given since to 
other financial and more over fully operational aspects of the leasing decision. These aspects 
can be quite difficult to price and compare with financial ones because of their often complex 
and subjective nature but even remote estimates can increase the overall significance of 
valuation. Smith and Wakeman (1985) were the first to introduce some non-tax incentives to 
lease. In their broadly recognized study they discover that leasing is more likely if the value 
of the asset is less sensitive to use and maintenance decisions, if the expected period of use is 
short  compared  to  the  useful  life  of  the  asset,  if  the  firm  is  closely  held,  if  the  lessor  has  
market power or if the lessor has a comparative advantage in asset disposal. These all are very 
typical characteristics of airline business and apply well also to the case of Finnair who is for 
the most part state owned and the remaining share is largely owned by institutions. Aircraft 
value  is  less  sensitive  to  use  because  several  other  factors  also  affect  on  the  value.  
Additionally, aircraft are generally leased for a shorter period than their economic life. Also, 
lessors do have a market power and advantage when disposing aircraft due to their superior 
expertise in the market.  
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Research in the 1980’s and 90’s concentrate on the agency costs, asymmetric information and 
especially embedded options in the leasing contracts (McConnell and Schallheim, 1983). 
Sharpe and Ngyuen (1995) state that one incentive for leasing is asymmetric information 
because they find that with leasing those unfavourable effects of asymmetric information can 
be decreased. McConnell and Schallheim study different options attached to the operating 
leasing. Basis of their study is that operating lease is cancellable at any time which is against 
the current practice. However, in their comprehensive study they present a model to valuate 
lease with options like extension, purchase anytime, purchase at maturity and purchase 
requirement. Also Smith (1979) and Copeland and Weston (1982) evaluate leases with 
options. Latter explained that if for example an operating lease is cancellable, it can be 
thought to have an American put option attached. To capture the variation in the asset value, 
they use the standard deviation of asset returns as an estimate.  
In the eighties it was already clear that basic discounted cash flow models aren’t flexible 
enough for option valuation. There was a need for a more sophisticated method that could 
capture the uncertainty related to future cash flows in different states of nature and really 
value the flexibility gained from the different options. While basic DCF-methods can model 
risk, they do not contain any in-build uncertainty or probabilities. To answer this call, a real 
options analysis begun to form. 
Earlier in the 1970,’s Black & Scholes (1973) had developed their continuous-time model for 
option pricing and were followed by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) who created a binomial 
pricing model with risk-adjusted decision trees.  These authors laid the foundation for the 
modern day option valuation. Real option analysis (ROA) is a method derived from both 
DCF- and financial options valuation models. Grenadier (1995, 1996) is one of the many 
authors who apply this method to leasing. 
While proven quite versatile tool it has a pitfall inherited from option pricing models. Those 
models are based on continuous trading in liquid markets which is not true regarding options 
in lease agreements. Nevertheless, this method has gained a substantial popularity in 
academic world. The actual analysis starts with basic DCF-model, then a Monte Carlo 
simulation is run to capture volatility and finally binomial lattice (decision tree) is created 
based on established volatility. In other words every nod of the tree is given a probability and 
this enables to calculate the volatility of investments present value. ROA provides thus means 
to value the flexibility by enabling to value projects in various states of nature. Downside is 
that this method easily gets quite complicated and takes some time to implement.  
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Stonier (1998, 1999, 2001) apply this concept especially to aircraft option valuation. He 
studies particularly aircraft purchase and delivery options by adapting manufacturing lead-
times and the cyclicality of the airline business to the options. Methodologically, he uses DCF 
analysis,  decision  trees  and  binomial  real  options  valuation.  He  notes  that  although  airlines  
realize that these options carry some value they do not actively use any accurate methods to 
capture that value. Meanwhile, also manufacturers are underestimating the value of these 
options  giving  away  delivery  slots  for  a  low  cost.  This  implies  that  airlines  are  somewhat  
aware  of  the  real  options  analysis  but  its  use  isn’t  that  common.  Gibson  (2010)  applies  this  
method to aircraft family conversion options in his study. 
In his advanced study, Otero (2006) focuses on the finishing end of the leasing contracts in 
the option valuation as he study residual values and residual value guarantees (RVG’s). He 
explains that RVGs are purchased from manufacturers, leasing companies, or insurance 
companies and can be full RVG’s which are rare or partial guarantees that are more common. 
Because the pricing of their guarantees are naturally embedded into the agreements, he tries to 
price them with real options analysis. He models the future residual values in different states 
of nature using historical data and finds that nominal annual base value depreciation varies 
between 3.08% for  single-aisle  aircraft  and  4.42% for  wide-bodies.  He  also  calculates  price  
volatility as the standard deviation of such values and the outcomes vary from 4.10% to 
4.15%. With his calculations, Otero find the values of the full RVG for a $100m wide-body 
aircraft (by chance roughly estimation of the current market value of A330) vary under 3% of 
the residual value covered. 
Monte Carlo simulation is a risk-analysis method that enhances the plain net present value 
method by taking uncertainties into account. Certain, or all, variables are given distributions 
or variations and the model is then run several hundreds or even thousand times. The result is 
a distribution of net present values. Thus, it is a method based on the basic NPV but adds the 
capability to capture the risk of airline cash flows. This is very useful method to capture usual 
uncertainties in the aviation business like residual values. This method requires subjective 
judgement or historical data and is therefore exposed to subjectivity. Monte Carlo simulation 
was first introduced by Hertz (1964). Initially it wasn’t a great success and was criticized for 
example by Lewellen and Long (1972) and Bower and Lessard (1973) due to its complexity 
of use and hard interpretation of results. Gibson (2010) responds that this should not be a 
problem anymore because of increasing amount of easy to use Monte Carlo applications 
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available, especially as add-ins for Excel. Also this study will capitalize on this type of 
research method when analysing the acquisition of Airbus A330. 
These recent applications of capital budgeting methods mean a significant improvement for 
the assessment of different agreements. They are especially significant when analysing leases 
because now one of the most important characteristic of a lease, flexibility, can be at least 
roughly valued. The static NPV analysis cannot really capture the flexibility needed due to 
prevailing uncertainty in the business. 
3.3.3 Flexibility and other reasons why airlines lease 
As  mentioned,  one  of  the  most  rationalized  operational  aspects  of  aircraft  leasing  is  the  
flexibility. Leasing can induce flexibility in various ways. Next, I try to bring up the most 
important and most often quoted reasoning, particularly in the field of aviation. 
Dick Forsberg, head of strategy at Irish aircraft lessor Avolon Company summarizes the basic 
reasons why airlines turn to lessors.38 In Aviation International News, he says that lessors can 
offer three distinct features to airlines: flexibility to financing mix, availability of aircraft that 
are sold out from the manufacturer and provision of liquidity also to companies with weaker 
credit ratings. Indeed, airlines in a highly capital-intensive and low-profitable aviation 
business face often cash constraints and are therefore forced to favour debt or leasing. Leasing 
could also be an only choice to a company with covenant disabling the possibility for a debt 
financing. However, this is quite rare in nowadays where leasing is seen as a replacement for 
a debt. Nevertheless, leasing does not tie so much initial capital as purchase. Naturally when 
leased, an airline does not have to make a large purchase payment but also the pre-delivery 
payment usually needed when entered into leasing contract is much smaller than pre-
payments required when purchasing the aircraft.  It  is  estimated that on the day of the actual 
delivery, about 30% of the aircraft has been already paid as pre-payments (Finnair). 
In  airlines,  flexibility  relates  often  to  fleet  planning.  Because  of  cyclical  nature  of  the  
business, fleet flexibility is an asset itself in an airline. During different and fluctuating states 
of economy and demand airlines require flexibility to either quickly obtain or lay aside 
aircraft. To be able to increase or decrease capacity in short term basis can be necessary for 
instance when introducing new routes or to respond to fluctuating demand. It is generally 
believed that leasing offers this flexibility more than owning an aircraft. Leasing allows 
                                               
38 http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-air-transport-perspective/2012-10-22/sumitomo-seeks-top-three-
slot-growing-lease-market, retrieved 25.10.2012 
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airlines to quite rapidly include or displace aircraft. Leasing is often used when adopting new 
aircraft type or as an exit strategy (Gibson, Morrell, 2004) due to the ease of arranging 
contracts to terminate or start stepwise. Flexibility is increased also by arranging lease 
contracts so that they either differ with their maturity or do not terminate at the same time 
with each other. However, as pointed out from Finnair this may be not the whole truth 
because it depends heavily on the size of the fleet. For example Finnair with the fleet size of 
about  60  aircraft  cannot  naturally  achieve  the  same  level  of  flexibility  than  a  larger  airline  
with the fleet of such as 600 aircraft.  
One important aspect of leasing is transaction costs. As Copeland et al. (2005) point out, 
shorter the need for an asset, for example a need of a car for a week, the more favourable it 
becomes to lease it because of the transaction costs. Transaction costs may include search 
costs, clerical costs and costs of valuating, assuring and maintaining quality. Transaction costs 
are always relevant when the time period of leasing is less than asset’s economical life. 
Another operational perspective emerging in literature is the moral hazard problem of leasing. 
It refers to a situation where a lessee because of not owning the asset has no incentive to take 
as good care of it as when owned because a lessee does not have to worry about the residual 
value in the future. The problem is usually solved by adding a moral hazard cost in a lease 
payment or like in aircraft leasing where a maintenance obligation is included in a contract. 
With assets like aircraft this moral hazard may not be such a great problem after all because 
by regulations and law, aircraft should be kept in good condition and properly maintained at 
certain intervals due to nature of the business. However, if a company owns maintenance 
department this issue may raise its importance when considering a purchase of aircraft.  
Usually under an operating lease, a lessee is committed to make either security deposit or 
maintenance reserve payments (or both). Security deposit is paid at the beginning of the 
contract and paid back when the asset has been returned in a pre-specified condition. The 
amount of the deposit can be for example three months rental. Maintenance reserves are paid 
along the agreement to ensure the lessor of the condition of the asset.  This method mitigate 
the credit risk that lessor bears. In case a lessee defaults, maintenance reserves secure the cost 
of the required maintenance before the re-deployment of the aircraft to the next customer. 
Also some end of lease payments may occur if the equipment is returned under-maintained. 
Of course reasonable return conditions need to be agreed by both parties. Often a lessee is a 
receiving  side  and  does  not  have  that  much  room  for  manoeuvre.  So,  when  evaluating  
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financing options these costs should also be taken into account. Lease rate estimates used in 
this study already include the maintenance reserves. 
However, also purchase of an aircraft brings certain benefits over leasing. A purchase 
favouring aspect is the aircraft configuration. This can be actually very valuable aspect 
because airlines can only have an influence on limited features when leasing. But when 
purchased, aircraft can be assembled according to acquirer’s preferences down to the smallest 
detail. This is an important feature to airlines as they then have a freedom to customize the 
aircraft prior to delivery rather than with extra cost when leased. One solution to this 
particular challenge is the sale and lease-back agreements where an airline purchases an 
aircraft but immediately sells it to lessor and leases it back. This arrangement enables the 
modifications made to the aircraft and the financing method wanted. Of course this method 
comes with also other advantages and challenges but they’re outside of the range of this 
thesis. Lease contract requirements could also give support to purchasing. Aircraft leasing 
contracts often include some administrative, reporting or maintenance requirements for a 
lessee. Administrative and reporting costs can rise at least momentarily in the near future 
when new IFRS regulations take effect and also operating leases will transfer to the balance 
sheet. Thereafter, those agreements need to be monitored on same basis than financial ones. 
Flexibility means often options. Options you can either exercise or choose not to. Aircraft 
purchase and leasing contain actually a lot of different options. Some of them were already 
mentioned in the previous sub-section but here is a brief overview of the relevant options. 
Increasing the fleet size can be achieved with purchase options and purchase rights that are 
call options. The first mentioned can actually mean two things. First, it could be related to 
operating lease agreement and enable the lessee to purchase an aircraft at the maturity of a 
lease with a pre-determined price. Second, it could also mean an option very commonly 
acquired at the same time when placing firm orders on aircraft. It allows an airline to delay 
the purchase of additional aircraft until market conditions are favourable or just to space out 
the purchases. Then, when needed, airline can confirm the purchase at the pre-determined 
price. This also allows airline to the manufacturing queue, that is, a delivery slot. Holloway 
(2003) points out, that manufacturers tend to sell these options on discount. Purchase right, 
also called rolling option,  also means the right to purchase an aircraft at agreed price in the 
future but it  does not have a delivery position attached to it  so airlines are taking a risk that 
there isn’t one available just when they need it and they end up in the back of the line. On the 
pro-side, with this option airlines spare themselves from deposit of 1-2% of the purchase price 
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usually demanded at the time of the order. McConnell and Schallheim (1983) valuate lease 
contracts with different options. They present a model to price an operating lease with a 
purchase option. The value of the option should therefore be added to lease rentals. However, 
they remind that often lessors grant the lessee an option to purchase the leased asset at its 'fair 
market value' at the maturity date of the contract.  If you think it though, the lessee can 
purchase the asset at its market price at maturity of the lease whether or not the contract 
contains such an option. Therefore they stress that  an option to purchase the asset  at  its  fair  
market price is valueless. 
Probably  the  two  most  common  options  related  to  aircraft  leases  are  cancellation  and  
extension options. These are pretty self-explanatory as the first allows the leasing contract to 
be terminated during the agreement and the latter enables airline to continue the lease 
agreement with terms agreed in advance.  What isn’t self-explanatory is their valuation. When 
considering the price of an option, it should be estimated with option pricing model. In 
general, airline managers tend to consider cancellation options quite expensive but extension 
options are more widely used.   
Another asset flexibility provider is quicker deliveries. By using operating leases airlines can 
ensure to have aircraft delivered quicker for example when there is large demand for a certain 
new type being manufactured. This is due to the fact that usually first (and often largest) 
buyers of a new aircraft type are the lessor companies. It is possible that you would need to 
wait several years for a delivery of a new, popular aircraft with high number of backlog 
orders. But with leasing there is usually always some leasing company who can offer any type 
of aircraft quite instantly for use. However, occasionally it actually pays off to be among the 
first buyers of a new aircraft type. This can also bring substantial discounts. Finnair has 
former experience from the McDonnell Douglas-era when Finnair was the first operator of 
MD-11 widebody airliner. Finnair will also be the first European carrier to operate with the 
brand new Airbus A350 scheduled to launch in 2015. Finnair has made a firm order for 11 
aircraft  with  8  additional  options.  This  project  has  been  delayed  several  times  and  even  the  
design needed to be changed on the way. Airlines already placed orders are being 
compensated for the delays and design alternations. Finnair has informed that they get new 
A350XWB’s (extra wide-body) at the same price as the original version, presumed to be a lot 
cheaper.39 This means substantial discounts, estimated amount of US$400 million. 40  Even 
                                               
39 https://newsclient.omxgroup.com/cdsPublic/viewDisclosure.action?disclosureId=171406&lang=en, retrieved 
24.10.2012 
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though discounts are pretty common in aircraft business, large price reductions like this are 
quite rare. Airbus is understood to be offering a discount of about 50% of the actual list price 
while the “normal” discounts end up being usually near 30-40%. In conclusion, one could 
argue that these first-in-line positions or delivery slots in the production line are very valuable 
in itself because airlines can give up their position in the queue for money.  
Stonier (1998) notes that aircraft manufacturers have recently contributed to asset flexibility 
by reducing lead times and introducing product commonality. Lead time means an aircraft 
manufacture time, nowadays around 12-18 months.41 Product commonality on the other hand 
means similarity between different aircraft models in the same aircraft family. For example in 
Airbus family, there are 4 different sized single aisle aircraft (A318-321) that despite of 
different size have same cockpits and other interiors, can have same engines etc. In widebody 
territory Airbus has A330/340 variables which are very similar with few major external 
differences like the amount of engines. Of course the capacity to carry passengers and cargo 
and the range of these aircraft vary. This commonality reduces several costs like maintenance, 
training, spare parts etc. and offers increased flexibility for example in route planning. 
Manufacturers may thus offer switching options which means that after the initial order, the 
customer  has  a  possibility  switch  between  aircraft  models  prior  to  delivery.  If  for  example  
passenger demand or route structure changes so that there is a sudden need for aircraft of 
different size or range, this option can be exercised.  
At this point I would like to point out that the operational fleet planning goes beyond the 
scope of this research but it is good to remember that when an airline is planning what kind of 
equipment they need for their route structure and according to estimated passenger demand 
etc., the financing decision is definitely not the only question it faces. Of course it is rather 
important but many operational aspects affect also on the acquisition. In airlines there are 
quite typically separated departments for technical fleet planning and finance. If the co-
operation between them isn’t comprehensive enough, it may actually endanger the finding the 
best overall acquisition decision. Even though the purist financing theory criticizes combining 
the investment and financing decision, in real life it sounds incompetent. An example could 
be a pure technical choice of aircraft X because it fits perfectly for the route structure and has 
a sufficient range and capacity. The much cheaper aircraft Y will be abandoned because it is 
                                                                                                                                                   
40 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/airbus-resorts-to-huge-discounts-on-a350/story-e6frg8zx-
1111113379567, retrieved 24.10.2012 
41 The Aircraft Value Cycle, Pk AirFinance, Nils Hallerstöm, 15.05.2000, retrieved 1.10.2012 from 
http://pricing.free.fr/docs/safe/safe2.pdf 
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just barely inferior to X but would still qualify for the fleet. If the financing decision is made 
after the investment one, it could cause a substantial economic loss considering the price 
difference. In conclusion, it is wise to include the financing perspective to the fleet planning 
process from the very beginning. 
For example above-mentioned commonality can play a big part in the decision making. It is 
very common that an airline has different aircraft from different manufacturers in their fleet 
but there are also airlines whose entire fleet consists of the same aircraft type. These are 
usually low cost carriers. For example, Ryanair has a fleet of 275 Boeing 737-800 aircraft and 
Norwegian Airshuttle 56 B737’s. American Southwest Airlines including its subsidiaries fly 
with a whopping 698 B737 aircrafts. Easyjet operates with 193 Airbus A319/320 aircraft.42 
These kinds of companies have taken the commonality at the highest level. Of course this cuts 
the operating costs but from the financing perspective it is obvious that large bulk discounts 
are given for large orders. For example when American Airlines and Delta Airlines placed 
large orders and committed to long-term relationship with Boeing in the mid-nineties, they 
both stated that Boeing rewarded them with price discounts and increased flexibility in the 
timing of the deliveries.43  
Price reductions are generally known to exist but however, this raises an interesting attention 
towards the relationships between airlines and lessors. Naturally bulk discounts are a part of 
the business practice but could there be other reasons for price reductions? If an airline is 
committed to certain manufacturer’s planes, it is assumed that competitors will offer 
substantial price reductions when it is time to update the fleet. So, relationships with 
manufacturers can be important and aircraft acquisitions can even take political turns 
considering the nationalities of the main two aircraft manufacturers. 
So when considering all the facts above, naturally the flexibility is worth something. But how 
much? According to classic option value theory the greater is the uncertainty the more worthy 
is the option. Therefore, in uncertain times or industries, the flexibility is very valuable. 
Barrington (1998) highlights that airlines using operating leases value flexibility so much that 
they accept the higher cash costs of leasing than induced by the ownership of aircraft. Stonier 
(1998) adds that in airlines required rates of return for investments are often significantly 
higher than the cost of capital. This implies that discount factors are being artificially raised to 
                                               
42 Figures acquired from operators websites in 24.10.2012 
43 http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/21/business/delta-to-buy-only-boeing-jets-for-20-years.html, retrieved 
24.10.2012 
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meet the probable higher risks due to cyclical nature of business or whatever subjective 
reason of management. Of course, this leads more likely to abandonment of some 
investments. In fact, Stonier argues that this spread between the cost of capital and a hurdle 
rate is the value of flexibility that isn’t included in classical capital budgeting analysis. He 
continues that in his opinion, the flexibility is created by asset flexibility, management’s 
learning and adaptation to the dynamic environment. The most common method among the 
academics to valuate these different options is the above-mentioned real options analysis. 
Brealey and Myers (2003) also suggest the use of APV to capture the option induced 
premium. 
As previously mentioned, one of the major advantages of operating leases is the residual 
value  risk  transfer  to  the  lessor.  Airline  managers  say  it  could  be  the  most  important  thing  
when evaluating operating leases, and a very difficult one to value as well. Next sub-section 
covers the residual value in more depth and explains the essence of the aircraft value and asset 
liquidity. 
3.3.4 Residual value - aircraft valuation  - asset liquidity 
A significant and probably the most important advantage of operating lease is the transfer of 
residual value risk to the lessor. Residual value risk is the uncertainty between the anticipated 
and the actual value of an asset at the end of an agreement. Because operating leases are often 
quite short  term, do not cover the whole estimated life of the asset  and most importantly do 
not involve transfer of the asset ownership at the end of an agreement, the residual value risk 
is bore by the lessor. This is especially valuable option for airlines in the business where the 
residual  value  risk  can  be  substantial  due  to  expensive  assets  and  the  estimation  of  the  
residual values can be quite challenging. That is because several factors affect on the value of 
the aircraft and only list prices of aircraft are public information while real purchase prices 
can be substantially lower due to bulk discounts.  
Why lessors are ready to carry that risk then? First of all, of course they are compensated for 
it by including a risk premium in the lease rates. Future lease payments need not only cover 
the long-term financing costs of the asset but also an adequate compensation for carrying the 
residual value and other risk. Second of all, lessors are experts in the area of handling and re-
allocating the aircraft so they have the best knowledge of demand of the certain aircraft and 
they have the network of operators ready when they need to find a new owner for aircraft. 
This means that a single airline disposing its aircraft spares on inconvenience and information 
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etc. expenses related to finding the buyer and negotiating about correct price when choosing 
to lease in the first place. Probably this is priced into the lease rentals though. Gavazza 
(2010b) explains that leasing companies have their own technical, legal and marketing 
professionals who constantly gather information from the market by monitoring the airlines’ 
use of aircraft and their possible capacity needs. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) and Rampini 
and Viswanathan (2010) suggest that these “monitoring costs” cause the implicit lease rates to 
be higher than when owning an aircraft. Gavazza confirms this proposition by studying 
aircraft prices and lease rates and finding that indeed these lease rates are 20% higher than 
implicit rental rates. 
Third, lessors have a substantial purchase power to aircraft manufacturers. Many airlines are 
facing constraints to purchase new aircraft, so they turn to lessors, many times their last resort 
of finance. And lessors act as manufacturers’ distributors. Manufacturers rely on large orders 
placed by lessors and are therefore willing to give substantial price reductions.  Stonier (1998) 
describes the relationship of the lessors and manufacturers “symbiotic”. He also stresses that 
lessors  often  get  short  configuration  lead  times  because  the  operator  of  the  aircraft  is  often  
known only few months before the delivery. Stonier thinks that airlines value flexibility so 
much that leasing companies are actually successfully arbitraging aircraft delivery flexibility. 
Lessors can offer much faster access to aircraft due to their top delivery slots. Meanwhile, 
manufacturers are also increasing their delivery flexibility with reduced lead times. Stonier 
says it is interesting to see will these two sides continue to complement each other or will the 
competition be tightened. What makes this even more interesting is that manufacturers have 
started to also provide leasing services through their own subsidiaries. Theoretically this also 
has an effect on lease rates because the basis of their determination is the manufacturer’s cost 
for a manufacturer but for third party lessor, the price paid to the manufacturer. To sum up, 
leasing companies are better suited to carry the residual value risk and lessees are willing to 
pay for this risk management.  
Naturally however, the transfer of residual value risk comes with a price tag. Therefore under 
an operating lease, monthly lease payments include a premium to the lessor for bearing the 
risk. Gibson (2010) points out that operating lease payment includes also a capital cost of the 
depreciating aircraft and an implicit interest charge for financing the asset. So for an airline, 
in the end it comes down to the trade-off between the increased operational flexibility and 
higher financial costs due to short-term leasing. Oum et al. (2000) introduce a model to define 
the optimal mix of leased and owned aircraft in a particular fleet. They interestingly find that 
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the proportion of leased aircraft within 23 largest airlines in the world should range between 
40% and 60%. The question here is how to quantify this operational flexibility and residual 
value risk transfer? According to Gibson and Morrell (2004) there are two methods, both 
based on discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques. The first is the previously mentioned 
adjusted present value (APV) method and the second one real options analysis (ROA). With 
APV different risk classes are discounted with proper costs of capital that reflect the real 
riskiness of the cash flows. They suggest that residual value should be discounted with the 
cost of equity to really capture the price of this flexibility. ROA captures the flexibility by 
enabling the problem arrangement with various states and different options to choose from.  
Gibson (2010) doubts if residual value risk is correctly priced in reality. He justifies his 
doubts amongst with the facts like that the market for residual value risk is illiquid, there are 
only limited amount of sellers and buyers of used aircraft at any time, information availability 
of prices is poor and valuation techniques as real options analysis isn’t yet in common usage. 
This means that residual values can easily be either over- or under-priced. Managers 
interviewed by Gibson say that currently residual values are rather under-priced. To cover the 
residual value risk, a residual value guarantee can offer a solution. Managers see the possible 
need for a guarantee especially in a case of large, illiquid aircraft which are expected to be 
replaced by newer models during the investment period. Airbus A330 could have some of 
those features even though its popularity is quite good at the moment. Widebodies are 
generally more illiquid and this aircraft type will be superseded by Airbus A350 in few years. 
However, third party insurers could be hard to find because the market for them isn’t very 
developed in the current environment where large exotic risks are been avoided. 
Residual value is very significant factor in the investment analysis. Shorter the selected time 
period for an investment, more emphasized its effect is. Gibson (2007) illustrates that in his 
study the present value of aircraft residual value represents almost 45% of the total value if 
the investment horizon is 7 years and decreased to 18% if the horizon is lengthen to 15 years. 
Gibson criticizes that too often airlines use short periods in their analysis. The estimated 
residual value can easily be the determining factor of an analysis with 10 year horizon. I’m 
recognizing this in my study by analysing financing decision in 8- and 16-year time period. 
I’m  assuming  a  renewal  of  a  lease  after  the  first  8  years  as  Gibson  suggests.  Renewal  
considers a lease rental to be re-checked, thus forecasted lease rentals of that time will be used 
in the remaining 8 years. 
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As said, the actual purchase prices of aircraft aren’t public information but rather closely 
guard secrets. It is general knowledge that no airline actually pays the full list price but there 
are always some sorts of discounts. It is been estimated that discounts vary from 20% to even 
60% with an average around 45% of the list price. (Michaels, 2012) He calculated this from 
manufacturers’ yearly published order backlogs which include contract values, planes ordered 
and their list prices. Thus, bargaining power of the parties plays a significant role in the 
pricing negotiations. Airline executives state however that much of that discount can be 
erased when taking into account inflation with the fact that usually planes are ordered in 
batches and delivered over many years. Why then this kind of secrecy prevails? Michaels 
explain that this is plain psychology; inexperienced buyers, although supposed reaching a 
good deal, do not want to embarrass themselves by revealing that they might have overpaid. 
At the same time, professional buyers understand not to anger manufacturers by talking too 
much and thus ensuring golden deals also in the future. He concludes that future will most 
probably bring increasing list prices and same time even larger discounts. 
The capital cost of aircraft can represent over 15% of airline costs (Morrell, 1999). This 
makes the valuation pretty important. I mentioned earlier that the value of an aircraft depends 
on surprisingly many factors, next I’m going to explain the basic elements affecting the value 
of an aircraft.  
Vasigh and Erfani (2004) list some factors affecting the theoretical value of an aircraft. Later 
the list was complemented by Gorjidooz and Vasigh (2010). First, the physical characteristics 
like specification, age, seat capacity, fuel efficiency and physical condition together with 
maintenance status have an effect on the value of an aircraft. In addition, external factors like 
state of the economy, inflation and interest rates, fuel cost, safety issues and regulation and 
environmentally regulations have an influence. However, according to the authors, the value 
depends mostly on the cash flows the aircraft can generate. Vasigh and Erfani propose that the 
expected theoretical value of an aircraft is the present value of the net cash flow it produces 
during  its  life  span.  In  the  same  line  continue  Gorjidooz  and  Vasigh  who  create  a  
comprehensive model to estimate the theoretical value of an aircraft, also based on future cash 
flows discounted back to current date.  
Of course, also technical issues affect on the depreciation of the value because maintenance 
expenses will increase year by year due to physical deterioration. For example, aircrafts 
engines will require more maintenance; it will also gain weight over its life and suffer from 
increased drag due to repairs and dirt. This depreciation will increase operating costs. 
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However, the technical life of an aircraft is theoretically unlimited because it can be 
overhauled but its economic life is restricted. As Vasigh and Erfani point out, when an aircraft 
cannot produce a positive cash flow, its economical life ends and the asset is retired.  
But why those operating cash flows turn in some point to negative? In addition to 
deterioration, these factors are explained below. At some point every aircraft will be 
superseded by a more modern aircraft model with improved qualities like increased fuel 
efficiency, reduced noise levels, improved aerodynamics, advanced systems, decreased 
weight and etc. This will again have affect on the cash flow generating capacity of the 
aircraft. 44 It is notable that aircraft delivered late in their production cycle will depreciate 
faster than those that were delivered early. On the other hand, the very early ones may suffer 
from excess weight and other early batch issues.  
One already mentioned aspect relating to life span of aircraft is commonality. It can 
dramatically increase the service life of an airplane if it could be easily and with a low-cost 
modified. For example, Airbus considers freighter conversion as an important value creator 
for a used aircraft. Especially efficient and cost-effective widebodies can stretch their service 
time substantially when converted to cargo use. Older A300s and A310s have shown this in 
reality. Airbus thus informs that all their widebody aircraft have the optimised fuselage cross-
sections, offering full interline capability, which creates good potential for freighter 
conversions at the appropriate time. Also further developments like increasing maximum take 
off-weight, which enables to take more cargo or passengers, have a value creation effect. 
Fuel is also one of the key factors determining the value of an aircraft. Increased fuel prices 
have reduced the popularity of older aircraft types and are thus pushing operators to younger 
and more fuel efficient models. Jet fuel price is entirely dependent on crude oil price which is 
very sensitive to events in oil producer countries. This makes oil price to be volatile and the 
long-term trend is constantly upwards. 
It is observed that aircraft values tend to rise when economy is booming and decline when 
economy is slowing down. Otero (2006) finds that airline profits are correlated with the 
aircraft  orders,  which  makes  a  perfect  sense.  When profits  are  good,  it  means  that  seats  are  
full and there is a high demand of aircraft and therefore aircraft values increase. On the other 
hand, during a downturn there is a surplus of capacity and profits as well as values decline. 
What happens is that new aircraft are been ordered during the times of strong growth but due 
                                               
44 Modeling aircraft loans and leases, Pk AirFinance, Nils Hallerstöm, 03/2010, retrieved 1.10.2012 from 
http://www.pkair.com/pdf/article1.pdf 
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to manufacturing lead times of about 18 months, delivered many times in the times of low 
profit.  Nils  Hallerström,  the  president  of  PK  AirFinance  (subsidiary  of  the  largest  aircraft  
lessor GECAS) discusses about aircraft valuation and especially about the cyclicality of the 
business.45 He admits that values of aircraft are unpredictable and highlights depreciation life, 
capacity cycle, inflation and maintenance status as the key drivers for the value. He also 
shows a striking correlation between aircraft values and airline profits. He suggests different 
solutions to free up capital for example by leasing and emphasizes the importance of striving 
for highest return on risk capital rather than for the lowest cost of funds.  
On top of all these features, the value is naturally determined by the supply and demand. 
Passenger traffic growth is very much correlated with the GDP trend. Traffic estimations and 
a market overview are further discussed later. Estimated value can also alter very rapidly due 
to changed demand caused by increased competition or shocking events like 9/11. Major 
shocks that have impacted our economy and therefore also the sensitive airline business are 
for example the Gulf War, 9/11, SARS, bird flu and the current economic downturn. What 
makes this current cycle different is that there seems to be a fundamental change in the 
challenges airline face today.46 The peak in oil prices in 2008 caused increased costs and was 
faced especially airlines with older equipment. A need for more efficient aircraft emerged. 
However, although oil price has been stabilized, airlines now face much weaker state of 
economy as the anticipated growth has remained only at moderate level.47 
A methodology for estimating the cyclical effects on aircraft values has been developed PK 
AirFinance and by Nils Hallerström. He explains that three factors affect on the cycle of the 
aircraft value: traffic growth, deliveries of new aircraft and retirement of existing aircraft. In 
five year term, the first one is unpredictable, the second one somewhat predictable and the 
third one very much predictable. This lays the basics for their estimation of aircraft value 
development. He reminds that these cycles are caused by this ordering-production-delivery 
process that makes the supply and demand of aircraft go out of balance. This is due to quite 
long manufacturing lead times, typically 12-18 months, as discussed already earlier. The 
values of used aircraft rise when there is shortage of capacity and decrease in excess capacity. 
                                               
45 Set the capital free, Pk AirFinance, Nils Hallerstöm, retrieved 1.10.2012 from 
http://www.pkair.com/pdf/Setthecapitalfree.pdf 
46 AVAC – The Aircraft Value Analysis Company, Commercial Jets Volume 1, Current & Future Values & Lease 
Rates (2010-2030), Issue 38.1 - April 30th 2010, retrieved 16.1.2013 from http://www.aircraft-
values.co.uk/INTRO43mg.pdf 
47 Airbus - Global Market Forecast 2012-2031, Full Book, retrieved 28.10.2012 from 
http://www.airbus.com/company/market/forecast/?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=27599 
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As discussed, a launch of a competing aircraft type or also an advanced and more fuel 
economy engine can lower the value of an aircraft within few years after the competitive 
launch. New aircraft are introduced quite rarely and because of a long development and 
validation process there is some time to react to the news. But this is one important point to 
take into account before undertaking a long-term commitment. When considering an 
acquisition of certain aircraft types it is known that in few years a competing and more 
advanced model is also available in the market. This should be reflected also in the prices and 
lease rates. This cycle of new aircraft development can be predicted in some accuracy. The 
economical age of a particular aircraft model is thought to be around 25-30 years. However, 
the trend seems to be declining. Countries like Russia, Brazil, China and India have been 
formerly eager to take older aircraft but are now favouring more often newer equipment.48 
They seem to be rejecting aircraft older than 20 years which have led to a decreased demand 
for older aircraft. As Seidlitz predicts this could cause shorter finance terms and therefore 
increased uncertainty of residual values, lower advance rates and higher lease rates. It is been 
seen that aircraft values, default frequency and interest rates all seem to be affected by the 
cycle. If the cycle could be forecasted, it would ease the forecasting of aircraft values, default 
frequency and interest rates. 
In the current market situation, the most influential factors for value are age, maximum 
weights and their upgradeability, configuration and enhancements such as winglets.49 It  is  
notable that today the manufacturing year is more relevant than before when in addition to 
chronological age also total flying time was a factor. Especially crossing the thresholds of 10, 
15 or 20 years of age, decreases the value non-linearly. This indicates some sort of increased 
caution among the buyers. It can be anticipated than increased uncertainty can cause shorter 
finance terms and as a result higher lease rates. Also Kelly finds support for emphasized 
importance of age to the value. In his article published in Airfinance Journal he states that a 
whopping 66% of residual value is actually explained by aircraft’s age after all.50 
What makes this valuation process so complex is that there are infinite amount of occurrences 
that can affect on these factors. Some are more predictable than others but always some 
subjective estimation is needed and often it is based on historical values. Aircraft values are 
                                               
48 http://edition.pagesuite-professional.co.uk/launch.aspx?pnum=6&eid=1607145a-5fa1-4ac4-aae9-
e66ea4abee12, retrieved 25.10.2012 
49 Aircraft Finance Guide 2012, UBM Aviation, http://edition.pagesuite-
professional.co.uk/launch.aspx?pnum=6&eid=1607145a-5fa1-4ac4-aae9-e66ea4abee12 
 
50 2012 OPERATING LEASE SURVEY. Airfinance Journal. Jul/Aug2012, p1-1., retrieved 1.10.2012 
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thus very volatile and quite unpredictable in this dynamic industry. An important factor in 
aircraft value creation is also liquidity. 
Baker and Hubbard (2004) study asset liquidity in the trucking context and they report that 
more liquid assets tend to decrease the cost of external financing, thus preferring leasing. The 
explanation is that more liquid assets are more redeployable (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) and 
less specific (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Gavazza (2010a) examines asset liquidity 
in aircraft leasing market and discovers that more liquid the asset, more likely it is leased, 
particularly through operating leases, shorter the lease period of operating leases and lower 
the mark-ups of operating lease rates. He actually suggests longer holding periods for illiquid 
assets. Paper explains how the illiquidity of aircraft is affected by two main factors: the 
production of new units and the retirement of old units.  In other words,  when the aircraft  is  
still manufactured its liquidity is stronger but when the amount of the units starts to decrease, 
so does the liquidity. So, large operator base is the main key to liquidity. Gavazza also studied 
secondary aircraft markets and stated that they have grown steadily since mid-1980s and 
today transactions on used market are three times the amount of the purchases of new aircraft. 
This implies that the liquidity is at least increased. Gavazza backs up this argument by stating 
that all airlines around the world use more or less same types of aircraft, there are few aircraft 
types and this kind of asset can be flown to anywhere in the world in a day. 
However,  the  type  of  an  aircraft  has  a  definite  effect  on  liquidity.  Usually  narrow-body  
aircraft are much more liquid in the market than their more volatile wide-body counterparts. 
When assessing the market value of an aircraft and the willingness to bear the residual value 
risk in the future this is an issue to consider. Wide-body aircraft could be in that light more 
sensible to lease than purchase. Hallerström and Melgaard (2000) and Otero (2006) find the 
greater uncertainty of wide-body residual value forecasts relative to single-aisle aircraft. Also 
Gibson (2010) finds that the NPVs found to be lower for larger aircraft. General assumption is 
that larger aircraft are more risky due to market demand and a higher cost structure but also 
rewards can be higher. Gibson states that risks are indeed greater but he didn’t find any 
increased profitability, probably due to cyclical effects and volatile fuel prices. Gavazza 
describes aircraft as differentiated products which implies that they are imperfect substitutes. 
He reasons this with an example that there are different airplanes for different purposes, 
mainly meaning different ranges and capacities. However, I want to note that there usually are 
competing airplane types for every different purpose. Main aircraft manufacturers Airbus and 
59 
 
   
 
Boeing (of course companied also with other manufacturers) will make sure that a customer 
always has a choice between at least these two types despite the purpose of the aircraft. 
To  conclude  this  sub-section,  it  can  be  stressed  that  the  estimation  of  the  value  or  residual  
value of the aircraft is very complex and requires advanced methods. Residual value risk 
seems to be very concrete and the increasing trend for airlines is thus to transfer this risk to 
the lessors who are more capable to manage that risk. This is done in the form of operating 
lease. In favour, airlines are accepting higher induced costs. There seems to be some trends 
what kinds of aircraft are first of all acquired today and secondly under which financing 
method. Vasigh mentions that rising fuel prices and low interest rates make airlines acquire 
rather new than used equipment at the moment. Gavazza continues that more liquid assets are 
more likely to be leased. 
3.3.5 Estimating the cost of capital and risk adjustment 
Modern cash flow based capital budgeting methods require an estimate of the required return 
on investment, calculated as a percentage. The return of the investment is then compared to 
that required return in order to determine the profitability of the project. NPV calculates the 
actual cash value originated from the project, using a calculated cost of capital to deduct the 
required rate of return in each period. IRR on contrary gives the project’s rate of return, which 
can be compared to a required rate. So, with these DCF-calculations a cost of capital needs to 
be estimated. Usually it means both cost of equity and cost of debt.  
Bower  (1973)  finds  that  most  academics  agree  what  are  the  relevant  cash  flows  when  
assessing the value of lease. However, it varies what cash flows should be discounted with 
what discount rate. He suggests that lease rentals should be discounted with the firms cost of 
debt and all other cash flows like tax shelters, ownership costs and residual value with after-
tax cost of capital. Gordon (1974) and MDB argue for the use of before-tax cost of debt. On 
the opposing side are Ezzell and Miles (1983) who state that in certain situations the after-tax 
rate is the correct discount rate. Copeland and Weston (1982) agree by proposing that the 
correct discount rate is the after-tax one and adding that if the operating lease is cancellable 
then it should be higher and should be calculated as the option to cancel is an American put 
option. In the end, the use of after-tax cost seems to be the established practice today. Brealey 
and Myers (2003) justify this with the fact that the net cost of borrowing is the after-tax 
interest rate. In other words, company needs to pay tax on the interest received when lending 
money and can deduct interest payments from its taxable income when borrowing money. 
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In previously mentioned study Schall et al. (1978) find that the most common method to 
calculate the cost of capital or discount rate is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
by Modigliani and Miller. The second most popular discount rate used is the cost of debt 
leaving the cost of equity quite unpopular. Also "risk-free return plus a premium" method is 
mentioned in the responses. As Gibson (2010) points out, this method is essentially a CAPM 
(Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model)  approach  to  estimating  the  cost  of  share  capital.  CAPM  was  
introduced by few authors but maybe the greatest contribution to finance was given by Sharpe 
(1964). CAPM is used among other things to estimate the cost of equity. The model takes into 
account the correlation of the company’s share price to market returns often represented by 
the beta (?) as well as the expected return of the market and the risk-free rate. 
Schall  et  al.  discover also that the overwhelming majority of respondents are using after-tax 
discount rate and after-tax cash flows. Interestingly, researchers discover quite significant use 
of subjective measures to estimate the cost of capital. This implies that managers often prefer 
to use a combination of objective and subjective methods to estimate cost of capital. To adjust 
for risk in practice,  Schall  et  al.  find that managers tend to raise the discount rate for NPV, 
shorten the PBK period and raise the required rate of return in ARR. 
Surprisingly, in the mid-1990s, Trahan and Gitman (1995) describe in their survey that 
sensitivity analysis is the most commonly used technique to take risk into account. Over 60% 
of managers are using it according to results. This shows a substantial increase in its use. 
More advanced techniques such as Monte Carlo, and decision tree analysis weren’t that 
popular but not because the managers didn’t understand them. Bruner et al. (1998) find, in 
line with others, that DCF-models are the dominant valuation techniques and WACC is used 
to calculate cost of capital by the majority of companies. They also state that CAPM seems to 
be the dominant method in cost of equity estimation.  
Graham and Harvey (2001) note that cost of debt for a WACC calculation is relatively easy to 
find, whereas cost of equity is far more difficult to estimate. They find that nearly 3 out of 4 
respondents use CAPM to estimate cost of capital while 40% use average share market 
returns and do not adjust for the risk. One third found using the dividend discount model. 
They suggest that the use of multiple techniques means that managers prefer to compare 
several alternative measures to find an appropriate cost of equity. Related to risk adjustment 
in  valuation,  authors  discover  that  over  two thirds  of  respondents  make  adjustments  for  the  
market  risk  (?-value)  of  a  project.  They  state  that  this  confirms  a  wide  use  of  the  CAPM  
method and the so-called “project Beta” approach to estimating cost of capital.  
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Gibson and Morrell (2005) get similar responses from airline managers that previous studies 
suggest. The managers tend to prefer for WACC as a discount rate, followed by cost of debt. 
Authors interpret that the former implies a balanced view between shareholder and lender 
expected returns, while use of cost of debt may indicate that NPV analysis is used to justify 
projects  to  banks.  They  importantly  also  discover  that  while  cost  of  equity  is  an  important  
input to a WACC calculation, airline managers didn’t indicate very broad use of any 
estimation method to estimate it. Therefore authors mention that the popularity of CAPM 
seems to be less pronounced than in Graham and Harvey study. However, measures based on 
“experience” seem to be as widely used as CAPM in airlines. This wider use of experience or 
heuristics seems to be quite typical for airline industry. Gibson and Morrell (2005) show that 
the most common way to take risk into consideration is to artificially raise the discount rate 
making investment projects more difficult to justify. This finding is in line with the findings 
of Stonier (1998). It is usually based on subjective estimates or plain guess. This reveals the 
use of experience-based risk management but managers leave the question of how much 
should the discount rate be raised unanswered. Gibson and Morrell (2005) continue that the 
second common method for adjusting for risk is – no adjustment at all! Only after that comes 
evenly popular Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity analysis. Lowest preferences are found 
for Value at Risk (VaR) and “Beta”-method, latter being interestingly the most popular in 
Graham and Harvey study. Authors suspect that it is due to thinly-traded nature of the airline 
shares and the weaker preference for CAPM. Many financial managers reveal their negativity 
towards the Monte Carlo simulation as they find it a bit mysterious and a method that avoids 
responsibility in its results. Managers tend to prefer more visual than fully quantitative 
approach.  Gibson and Morrell (2004) suggest that a better approach than “artificially raising 
the bar” to adjust for uncertainty is to use a moderate cost of capital. This can be done by 
either using market measures such as some airlines have done or alternatively using long-term 
regional benchmarks (Dimson et al., 2002). 
As mentioned earlier, finding the cost of debt is relatively simple whether as estimating the 
cost of equity is pretty difficult. CAPM seems to be widely used also among airlines to 
estimate that cost. Under CAPM, historical share market returns on the firm and the market 
are used to estimate expected returns in the future. This will yield a ?-coefficient that 
measures the specific risk and therefore expected return for a share. A ?-value greater than 1.0 
means the share is more volatile than the market overall. One could suspect that this is the 
case also in airline business which is known for highly cyclical demand patterns and volatile 
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input prices. However, as Turner and Morrell (2003) analyse 10 airline ?-values, they find 
betas less than 1.0 on average. They also find that several financial information services 
provide substantially different betas for the same date. They explain that it could be due to the 
selected airlines, changes in the market as a whole or positive correlation with trading 
activity. Nevertheless, this reveals that estimating ?, and therefore cost of equity, is not exact 
science but depends heavily on methods used and their underlying assumptions. 
Authors also argue that when using CAPM, the estimates of cost of capital, especially ?, 
might be distorted in companies with substantial amount of shares that are not traded. This is 
many times true regarding state-owned airlines and therefore questions the suitability of 
CAPM in airline business. For instance Finnair is a typical partially-privatized carrier with 
56% state-ownership and in addition has large institutional investors with approximately 20% 
share.   In  several  publicly  available  sources  Finnair  was  given  a  ?-value  clearly  under1.051 
which is in line with the findings of Turner and Morrell. This raises the question of the 
understatement of Finnair’s ? in CAPM-calculus.  
To conclude, as there have been a clear trend towards the use of cash flow based valuation 
techniques  such  as  NPV  and  IRR,  similarly  the  WACC  has  taken  its  place  as  the  most  
reasoned discount rate. However, there seems to be differences in cost of capital estimation 
techniques. Usually managers prefer to use a combination of them, including both market 
based and heuristic methods. Subjective estimations are done quite universally. This is due to 
imperfect models or because historical data is not seen as relevant enough when predicting 
future values. Also the CAPM has found its place in valuation tool pack. However, some 
challenges are faced especially when estimating ?-values of government held and thinly-
traded airlines. Airline managers also take risk into account by using also sophisticated 
statistical methods like Monte Carlo and sensitivity analysis. However, at the same time as 
use of these methods has increased, statistical expected-return methods still remain 
problematic. The next sub-section discovers what valuation methods airlines actually use in 
their investment analysis. 
3.3.6 Valuation techniques actually used in airlines 
Now that I have explained the reasons behind the purchase or lease decision and previously 
presented the most common academic valuation techniques related it is time to explore what 
                                               
51 http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/financialHighlights?rpc=66&symbol=FIA1S.HE, retrieved 1.3.2013 
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techniques actually are being used in airlines and what sort of challenges are involved in 
them. Schall et al. (1978) approached a large sample of U.S. companies and studied the 
popularity of methods like traditional Accounting Rate of Return (ARR) and Payback period 
(PBK)  and  classical  Internal  Rate  of  Return  (IRR)  and  Net  Present  Value  (NPV)  in  the  
investment analysis. He discovers that PBK was the most popular (74% of respondents) 
method used but also NVP, which was least used, was used over half of the respondents. 
More importantly, he showed that the overwhelming majority combined these methods in 
their analysis. Also most managers mixed the traditional and classical measures.  
Trahan and Gitman (1995) continue to study the use of these methods in the 1990s. Their 
results confirm the clear acceptance of the classical valuation techniques and that these are 
substantially better understood than before and more frequently used than the traditional 
methods. The study was brought to 21st century by Graham and Harvey (2001), whose 
extensive U.S.-survey showed the dominance of NPV and IRR as primary methods used in 
investment analysis. Probably because of the development of cost of capital estimation 
techniques NPV is found almost as popular as IRR. Their study also includes more modern 
methods like adjusted present value and real options analysis which seem to enjoy very 
limited popularity. ROA was used 25% of respondents always or almost always as APVs 
respective percentage was only 10%, quite self-explanatory figure. 
Gibson and Morrell (2005) applied this type of research in airline business by gathering 249 
responds from airline Chief Financial Officers.  Their survey is comparable to the one of 
Graham and Harvey as they use same choice of preferences.  They gather responds from all  
over the world but they are slightly biased toward European airlines with relatively small 
fleets. Indeed, they state that their conclusions are most relevant for these groups. This suits 
very well the needs of this study as Finnair fits to this definition quite well. 
In their study they find that NPV in general is used extensively in airlines around the world 
together with another cash-based measure, internal rate of return and the rather simple 
payback period. They find a stronger preference for NPV than Graham and Harvey. Airline 
CFO’s seem to also favour PBK more than U.S. general business companies. Although being 
quite primitive method, it is very representational and understandable. McDonald (2000) and 
Alesii (2004) actually suggest that PBK may approximate the conclusions of more 
sophisticated techniques such as Real Options Analysis. 
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What surprises the authors is that accounting based method accounting rate of return ARR is 
clearly more popular in airlines than in general sample. The downside of using it is the lack of 
recognizing the time value of the money. Further, fewer CFOs said they use ROA always or 
sometimes compared to responds in Graham and Harvey. It is surprising considering airline 
business is known to have substantial amount different options related to aircraft acquisitions. 
Use of APV, on the other hand, is more frequently used in airlines. However, it is notable that 
only about 20% of CFOs use APV or ROA always or sometimes. Respective figures for NPV, 
IRR and PBK are 80%, 65%, 95%. This highlights the broad use of several different methods 
in airlines although there are severe flaws related to some methods. Airline financial 
managers were found to prefer using more than one technique to analyse investments, ranging 
between two to six methods. Above-mentioned percentages also reveal to authors that in 
general, as financial theory has evolved, cash-based measures have become the primary tool 
in valuation but more advanced methods like ROA and APV are not yet fully utilised in 
airlines. 
Above-mentioned results reveal that decisions made in airline managements are quite rarely 
based on more sophisticated techniques but usually on simple analysis and “gut feeling”. 
There is always subjectivity when making decisions and apparently aircraft acquisitions do 
not make an exception. Some amount of subjective assessment is naturally needed, especially 
when discussing about quite tailored products like aircraft. However, these assets are worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars in total and capital budgeting decisions at these volumes can 
make a critical difference to the profitability and even existence of an airline.  
This raises a question why there isn’t the most sophisticated tool set available in every airline 
finance department? However, one could stick up for financial managers saying that not 
always they have resources needed to familiarize themselves to the most recent academic 
researches. Academic models also too often suffer from complexity that is they are found 
difficult to adapt to real life applications. Moreover, these results are often found hard to 
believably sell to the management. It can be challenging to convince the board of directors 
which  does  not  necessarily  fully  consist  of  financial  experts  and  who are  accustomed to  be  
offered quite straightforward and simple numbers. When used advanced methods like ROA, 
directors are forced to evaluate the decision in different states of uncertainty and determine 
their tolerance to risk. 
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It  is  also  good to  remember  that  there  are  pitfalls  in  every  single  of  these  methods  and  that  
may eliminate some of them from the use. However, these pitfalls need to be understood 
before using them. I  present the most common pitfalls  of the methods described earlier and 
also used in my study. NPV is very popular among managers but contains some 
imperfections. The method requires the estimation of the cost of capital which can be quite 
difficult. This challenge is actually discussed in the next sub-section. Other drawback is that 
NPV is less intuitive than the simple percentage return, which is easy to compare to a bond 
return. Related to leasing, NPV does not recognize that lease payments include both financial 
and investing cash flows. (Gibson and Morrell, 2004) NPV also discounts all the cash flows 
with  just  one  cost  of  capital  regardless  of  their  riskiness.  The  model  also  assumes  that  debt  
and lease are perfect substitutes. IRR calculation does not require a cost of capital but has 
other flaws. It can give contradictory results to NPV and can yield multiple answers if cash 
flows change sign more than once during the project. In addition IRR does not adjust for 
project size. Because of these deficits, academics tend to strongly favour NPV. To be able to 
estimate both the cost of equity and debt can be considered as one of the challenges of APV. 
Also the lower present value than in NPV counts for inconveniences of this method. 
While very popular among academics, ROA has two major drawbacks. First, the volatility 
estimations are often based on historical and subjective management estimates which can 
question the suitability of the data points in today’s market situation. Second, this method is 
used successfully for decades when evaluating financial options but still its popularity in real 
investment scenarios, especially among airline financial managers, is questioned. ROA seems 
to carry some sort of veil of mystery around it because Gibson finds that the method is 
perceived  as  too  exotic  while  the  relevance  of  its  math  is  challenged.  For  some  reason  
financial managers actually have troubles considering ROA as a discounted cash flow based 
model.  
As a conclusion, it could be stated that since 1970’s the cash flow based classical financial 
valuation methods have increased their popularity, the most common ones being currently 
NPV and IRR. These methods are found to be common also in aviation business but also 
traditional accounting and financial statements based valuation techniques have remained 
surprisingly common. Overall, the use of several different methods together is pronounced 
and the use of the most sophisticated techniques is scarce. So, clearly there is a need to ensure 
that the decisions are made with the best possible techniques available.  
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Gibson and Morrell (2005) thus suggest the use of APV, Monte Carlo simulation and ROA in 
investment valuation. They justify this by explaining that these applications extend classical 
techniques and bring broadly accepted statistical methods to the valuation analysis. These 
techniques are much more versatile and uncertainties for example in fuel price, market 
growth, type of aircraft or cyclical effects can be taken into account more extensively. In 
order to compare leasing and purchasing, they recommend the use of APV. This would help 
managers to convert investment decision form purely financial to more strategic one. In the 
next  sub-section  I  will  introduce  the  problematic  related  to  choosing  the  right  discount  rate  
and more over estimating the cost of capital. 
3.3.7 Lease as a substitute for debt? 
One beneficial characteristic that leasing has said to have is that it provides ”100% financing” 
meaning that capital investment requirements are reduced. This “leasing preserves capital” is 
however false reasoning because one could borrow the money needed while an asset serves as 
collateral. Another point made is that leasing provides an additional method of financing in 
addition to debt. This reason is seen today as a dubious reason for leasing by for example 
Brealey and Myers (2003) because they consider leasing and debt as substitutes. It means that 
company cannot think that leasing would provide some “additional funds” available on top of 
debt financing because lease always consumes the overall debt capacity of the company.  
But how much is actually very relevant question. According to several studies leasing does 
displace at least some amount of debt but not necessarily in one-to-one relation. The issue of 
substitutability of debt and lease has been discussed among academics for years but empirical 
findings are controversial. Traditionally, in valuation of leases the basic principal is that a 
lease can be considered as an alternative to a debt. Benefits and disadvantages are different 
but it is common to think that certain amount of lease displaces same amount of availability 
for a new debt. That is, they are perfect substitutes. On this assumption rely for instance 
Marston and Harris (1988), Krishnan and Moyer (1994) and Copeland et al. (2005). This is 
regarded to be true at least in the case of financial leases which are more debt-like financing. 
On contrary, operating leases are different with their characteristics and are hard to classify as 
perfect substitutes for a debt. Indeed, other views are also present. 
Term “leasing puzzle” was created by Ang and Peterson (1984) when they contrary to the 
previous studies found out that debt and lease could actually be even partial complements and 
were agreed by Lewis and Schallheim (1992) later on. Also a third opinion is presented in the 
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literature when some researchers have suggested that debt and leasing are partial substitutes, 
Yan (2006). Present understanding is that they might not after all be perfect substitutes which 
would favour leasing. Beattie et al. (2000) find in their UK-based study that operating leases 
are  not  displacing  debt  one-to-one.  Their  results  imply  that  leasing  and  debt  are  partial  
substitutes, with £1 of leasing displacing approximately £0.23 of non-lease debt, on average. 
However, in this thesis I assume that leasing is a perfect substitute for debt and therefore the 
applied discount rate is after-tax WACC.  
This quite extensive chapter presented the theoretical framework related to acquisition of an 
aircraft  either  by  purchasing  or  leasing  the  asset.  When  putting  all  this  theory  into  practice  
several challenges are been introduced and some underlying assumptions have to be naturally 
made. The methodology is briefed more closely in the next chapter. 
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This  chapter  presents  the  data  and  methodology  used  in  the  study.  The  choices  and  
methodological selections are explained. First this chapter presents and justifies the selection 
of relevant data. Secondly, assumptions and realization of the study is detailed. The third 
chapter presents all the asset valuation techniques used in this study. 
4.1 Data 
First of all it is worthwhile to mention that the public data of the aircraft values is scarce due 
to the fact that majority of aircraft transactions’ prices are not disclosed publicly. Aircraft 
manufacturers provide list prices but they substantially differ due to bulk or other discounts as 
previously discussed. Furthermore, a few “bluebook” companies exist but their estimates of 
market and base values are not publicly available for free. Fortunately this study has a 
possibility to utilize data from two data providers, The Aircraft Value Analysis Company 
(AVAC) and Aviation Specialist Group (ASG). The former has produced current and future 
market values as well as lease rates on yearly basis for the next twenty years. The latter one 
estimates current market values and in addition base and future base values for every 
common aircraft type in the market. As AVAC tries to estimate the market value of aircraft 
taking into account for example economic cycles, the time value of money and maintenance 
reserves etc., ASG specifically excludes all these aspects as well as transaction costs. As book 
value is only some theoretical “trough the cycle” value, it does not have any real life 
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contribution and therefore this study will use only the market values of aircraft. This means 
excluding the data of ASG except their estimates of the current market value. Figures are 
prepared in the fourth quarter of 2012 and therefore reflect market conditions at that time.  
Both data providers emphasize that their data represents rather objective estimations based on 
both market information and expertise than accurate values based exclusively on recent 
market transactions. As stated, different methodologies naturally exist between data providers 
and therefore they aren’t necessarily comparable.  
AVAC provides a wide range of data as they present yearly US dollar - figures of current and 
future market values of aircraft and current and future lease rates. Values are adjusted for 
inflation estimated by the company. All market values are based on the year of build of the 
aircraft, assumed to be in the equivalent of half-life condition. New objects are brought down 
to half-life in year four. It is important to understand that current values are assuming that an 
aircraft is sold by a player other than manufacturer. This means that the current value is not an 
estimated purchase price. The more precise definition assumes that one unit is bought for cash 
by a willing buyer from a willing seller. Overall, values assume a mediocre object with 
average condition, standard interiors, avionics and most popular engines. Other combinations 
will have either lower or higher value and therefore also low and high values are presented to 
better cater for different specifications and finance terms. 
Lease rates are based on eight year lease term considering wide body airliner and that 
maintenance reserves are included so that the aircraft will be returned in the equivalent of 
half-life.  A medium risk credit, varied between different aircraft types, is assumed. Usually, 
older aircraft tend to be leased on shorter terms than newer ones and widebodies on longer 
terms  than  narrowbodies.  In  addition  to  basic  lease  rental,  also  high  and  low  current  lease  
rentals are presented. They reflect differing terms and credits. The future lease rates reflect 
changing market conditions. Generally, during weak market conditions lease terms are shorter 
and vice versa. AVAC forecasts interest rates for each year separately and they have been 
built in the presented lease rentals. 
As mentioned, AVAC only provide market values because they see base value too theoretical. 
As data provider explains, it is extremely difficult to predict future market values. Historical 
values provide some guide for the variation produced of some specific event but the nature of 
the industry will guarantee that such events will occur that have no previous reference. This 
makes room for judgement and presumptions, or subjectivity. It is being reminded that 
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reported values of transactions rarely represent all previously mentioned pre-assumptions and 
therefore should not put too much weight on. List prices can many times include additional 
cost items such as product support and training and financing levels for new aircraft can 
reflect list prices rather than the actual price paid. 
As a service industry, air transport is heavily dependent on the state of the economy for its 
growth. The values of aircraft are at first forecasted based on their economic service life and 
then exposed to other internal and external macro- and micro-economic factors such as traffic 
growth, state of the economy and inflation. To estimate this fluctuation of supply and 
demand,  AVAC utilizes  estimates  of  some British  clearing  banks  as  well  data  from OECD.  
They also incorporate four variables: the price of oil, interest rates, inflation level and GDP 
growth which all can have an effect on supply and demand of aircraft. They use GDP growth 
as  an  estimate  for  RPK  growth.  Choice  is  made  based  on  last  30  years  of  data  showing  a  
reasonably close correlation with the GDP and RPK growth. In addition to these factors 
different aircraft are given ratings based on almost 30 different general and specific variables 
affecting the asset strength. General variables are for example GDP, RPK, fuel, inflation, 
interest, yields and load factors. Specific variables can include for example orders, operators, 
number in service, backlog, geographical distribution, operator concentration, product life 
cycle, storage, level of availability, replacement proximity, replacement productivity, 
production rates, engine type, ETOPs, environmental compliance, MTOW, aircraft age, total 
hours an and cycles, registration, specification, lease rentals, number of lessors and retirement 
profile. 
It is important to understand that each of the variables impacts the other factors to a greater or 
lesser extent. According to AVAC, there is a clear relationship between GDP, RPK and 
aircraft values but they remind that it is not constant. They explain that when the economy is 
strong, traffic increases. Airlines thus experience increased load factors followed by higher 
yields. Higher ticket prices and restricted capacity boost new and current airlines to introduce 
more capacity. However, aircraft manufacturers cannot instantly offer increased production 
and this can cause a temporary shortage. AVAC reminds that this shortage does not 
necessarily force airlines to acquire older equipment. As the shortage situation prolongs and 
the difference between supply and demand intensifies, values tend to rise. However, there is a 
lag between traffic changes, lease rental raises and increases in values. Traffic will rise first, 
followed by lease rentals and finally values. Contrary, during a downturn values may fall 
before lease rentals. 
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By combining all these features AVAC presents for every specific year three different market 
values aka three different scenarios based on future market conditions. These are Mid, Worst 
and Best. Mid represents normal market conditions, Worst weak market and Best respectively 
a booming market. In the first three years of each forecast, the Best & Worst represent 20 per 
cent  probability  levels;  from  years  four  onwards,  the  Best  &  Worst  reflect  ten  per  cent  
probability. AVAC states that the longest reasonable forecasting period is 15 years. As 8 
years have passed, annual changes are less pronounced. It can be noticed from the decrease of 
variance between highs and lows. 
So, to conclude AVAC provides future values of aircraft by using their flexible, rather market 
based, model which takes into account also external variables such as inflation. The model 
tries to embed the changes in the state of the economy and the cycles where airlines tend to 
order new aircraft during upswing which are due to long manufacturing times delivered not 
until there is already a downturn. Aircraft values will decline over a fifteen year period and 
increase only during growth periods. Every time an aircraft loses its value, it is more difficult 
to regain it.  
AVAC’s statement about longest reasonable forecasting period together with the suggestion 
of Gibson and the prominence of residual value in shorter time periods, made me choose also 
the 16-year period in my analysis. It is 16 rather than 15 because it is easy usage as combining 
two 8-year periods and renewing lease rates at time eight. 
Below is a chart presenting estimated future values of A330-300 aircraft in three different 
scenarios in a twenty-year time period. It is notable that values decline in the same pattern 
because of the forecasted cycles and inflation are same in all scenarios. However, the worst 
case scenario seems to be declining at a higher rate than the other two. Best-case trend is very 
close to mid-case one but naturally values are higher. 2023 is a clearly an outstanding year as 
best-case value experiences even an increase and mid- and worst-case will decline only very 
slightly. This can be interpreted either as a forecasted boom period in the economy or an 
anticipated technical improvement for example of engines. 
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Graph 19. Estimated future values of A330-300 in US-dollars,  in three different states of economy 
during twenty-year period. Source: The Aircraft Value Analysis Company. 
 
In addition to aircraft values the financial data from Finnair’s financial statements have been 
used. Data is processed and statistical analysis carried out with statistical software Microsoft 
Excel.  
4.2 Implementation of the study 
4.2.1 Research method 
The research method of this thesis is a single-company case study. The purpose is to present 
and compare different asset valuation methods and their implications in the context of aircraft 
acquisition. Contrary to positivistic research, the purpose of a case study is not to produce 
new theory but instead examine the existing theory in a previously unexamined context or 
environment. However, I will create an excel-model, which enables comparison of financing 
methods with different variables. The model is built around the basic cash flow-based 
valuation  techniques  Net  Present  Value  (NPV)  and  adjusted  present  value  (APV).  It  also  
enables scenario and sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo simulation. These methods are 
described in detail later in this section.  
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The basic idea of my analysis is to compare the differences of benefits between the two 
financing methods, leasing and purchasing. This is done by estimating which method 
produces higher net present value of costs. This excludes operational costs, because they are 
believed  to  be  same in  either  way.  According  to  Finnair,  operating  costs  are  not  higher  for  
leased aircraft. Companies with higher credit risk may suffer from this phenomenon but not 
Finnair. So, the investment decision has been already made and here I analyse just the plain 
financing decision for a single aircraft acquisition. My model just analyses which financing 
method is preferable, not should an aircraft be acquired in the first place. Next I will describe 
some presumptions made in my analysis. 
4.2.2 Assumptions 
In this sub-section I will explain some assumptions that I was forced to made regarding my 
analysis.  
First of all, I want to clarify that the purpose of the model is that a user can easily try different 
inputs and see how it affects the financing decision. Results of the model are more suggestive 
than the exact truth. Suggestions reflect initial assumptions and the data accessible. Of course 
Finnair can use the model with increased precision due to their better knowledge of certain 
variables but for this study I will have to create an illustrative example which is an 
approximation. For example, I cannot use an actual purchase price of an aircraft but I have to 
estimate it from the list price provided by Airbus. However, my thesis still provides a decent 
tool for evaluation of the financing decision. Moreover, even if I had all the possible data in 
use, still probably the greatest factor of determining the lease or purchase question lies in the 
uncertain residual values (together with the initial price of course). 
To get back to the purchase price, an average list price of A330-300 was $239,4m in January 
201352,  which  reflects  the  time  of  the  order.  The  average  price  reduction  as  previously  
referred (Michaels, 2012) tends to be 45% in the industry. However, this can vary 
substantially when comparing the price of a single aircraft when bought solely or included in 
larger order. Finnair does not belong to largest customers of the Airbus and does not generally 
place large orders when considering widebodies so it could be justified that the price 
reduction is in any case maximum 50%. When considering purchasing a single aircraft, which 
is fairly theoretical, the discount could be even smaller. Finnair does, however, have a close 
                                               
52 http://www.airbus.com/presscentre/corporate-information/key-
documents/?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=14849, retrieved 5.3.2013 
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relationship with Airbus thanks to their previous orders of A320 family and widebodies A330 
and A340. Finnair is also one of the initial orderers of yet to be launched widebody A350 
XWB. These facts alone together with the previous history of large discounts between Airbus 
and Finnair already referred in sub-section 2.3.3 support a decent price reduction. Also the 
current state of the economy speaks for larger than “minimum” discount. Either way, it should 
be remembered that Finnair is still rather small airline in the order backlogs. Based on this 
breakdown I estimate the price reduction of 50% from the list price in a base case. This means 
a purchase price of $119.7M. According to Aircraft Value News, in October 2012 a new 
A330-300 was being offered at $102m so my estimate seems to be still on a conservative side. 
Estimated current market value, lease rates and residual values are obtained from the AVAC’s 
data. CMV, or current market value, is an estimated value for the standard aircraft with 
standard interior and avionics in January 2013. It is reasonable to believe that Finnair would 
be ordering an aircraft with quite standard characteristics, not the best possible but definitely 
not the minimum required equipment either. Current lease rate is also based on that. Current 
lease rates are generally quite low but actually rates of Airbus A330 have re-strengthened as 
mentioned earlier. Thus the monthly lease rate is estimated to be $840.000 monthly. Future 
monthly lease rates and residual values depend on the choice of time period and the state of 
the economy. However, the actual user of this model can naturally replace this value with an 
actual value offered by a leasing company. All figures are in US dollars. Corporate tax-rate in 
Finland  is  26%.  Finnair  states  that  their  aircraft  and  engines  as  well  as  flight  simulators  are  
depreciated on a straight-line basis over their expected useful lives. The acquisition cost of 
aircraft is allocated to the aircraft fuselage, engines and heavy maintenance and these are 
depreciated as separate assets. Finnair also specifies their depreciation schedules for different 
assets. New A330 family aircraft are depreciated over 18 years to a residual value of 10%. 
Annual depreciation is thus 5%. 
The time frame in my analysis is both eight and sixteen years. This is because data provider’s 
lease rates are estimated assuming eight year lease term. However, I want to also include a 
longer period to avoid overemphasizing the impact of the residual value and because 
widebody aircraft will normally have longer rental terms than narrowbodies. Also new 
aircraft tend to be on longer terms than older ones. This selection is also done to support my 
hypotheses,  that  is,  to study both short  and longer time periods.  Therefore sixteen-year time 
frame as an alternate is a justified choice. My analysis will treat 16-year period as two 
consecutive 8-year ones. This means that the lease is thought to be renewed at time 8 with a 
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lease rate of that time. My model assumes that lease payments are made in advance as in real 
life. However, in reality payments are due monthly but for simplicity my model runs on 
yearly basis. 
For an additional curiosity, I will also calculate an implicit interest for the lease and compare 
it to the interest of the debt. This will tell how much more expensive the equivalent lease is 
than an ordinary debt. This is rather straightforward method but admittedly pretty easy to 
comprehend and compare. This kind of method has been also in use in Finnair. This implicit 
interest means a theoretical interest for a lease. I obtain it by calculating and internal interest 
rate for an imaginary liability amounting debt minus an estimated residual value. The debt is a 
debt in accordance with the advance rate. In this study the “debt” is considered to be 
particularly senior secured debt. 
The advance rate, or the portion to be financed with the debt, is assumed to be the same as the 
present debt to total assets ratio. This is because theoretically WACC is the correct discount 
rate only when the capital structure of the investment and company are identical. Of course 
this isn’t always the case but particularly in asset intensive companies like airlines this seems 
to hold true much better than in general. Airlines’ capital structures resemble surprisingly well 
the actual investments.  
 
Next I will describe the CAPM and WACC calculations which determine the costs of capital. 
4.2.3 CAPM – Capital asset pricing model 
?? ? ????? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ??? 
 
 
Equation 1. Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM. re = cost of equity, E(Rj)= expected return of equity, 
rf = risk-free rate, ? = the sensitivity of the expected excess asset returns to the expected excess market 
returns, E(rm) = expected market return.  
 
Capital asset pricing model was introduced by Sharpe (1964) and is used among other things 
to estimate the cost of equity. The model takes into account the correlation of the company’s 
share price to market returns often represented by the beta (?) as well as the expected 
return of the market and the risk-free rate. It is pretty straightforward and thus widely 
criticized but no better replacement has been introduced yet. Probably the most problematic 
part of the model is the estimation of the beta-coefficient. 
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Morrell (1997) explains that airline industry is typically more risky than an average industry 
and therefore expects ?-values between 1.2-1.4. In practice, however, Turner and Morrell 
(2003) find that ?-values are much lower and very unsecure and depend heavily on the 
calculation method. They find a maximum ? of 0,150 for Finnair and even a negative one 
with another method. Authors thus suggest that these figures should be interpreted with 
caution and possibly CAPM isn’t the most suitable method for ?-value calculations. Reuters 
provide a ?-value of 0.74 for Finnair and 0.58 for the airline industry.53 Damodaran54 has 
found an average leveraged ? of 1.21 for the airline sector in his calculations based on 36 
companies. Chee-Wooi and Lee (2012) estimate systematic risk in East Asia and present 
average ?’s around 1.0. The uncertainty and volatility of estimated betas makes me wonder 
the correct one to use in my analysis. To accurately emphasize the riskiness of the business 
and not to distort the analysis by overemphasizing the value of ?, I choose to use a ? of 1.2. 
The results from my CAPM calculations are presented in the next sub-section together with 
the WACC. 
4.2.4 WACC – Weighted average cost of capital 
Modigliani & Miller (1963), after-tax Proposition II: 
 
???? ? ??
?
?
??????? ? 	T???DV 
 
 
Equation 2. Weighted average cost of capital, WACC. re = shareholders’ expected annual return, rd = 
annual interest rate on borrowing, E = the market value of the firm’s shares, D = the market value of 
the firm’s debt, V = the total market value of debt and equity. 
 
To calculate the weighted average cost of capital or WACC, I need to know the capital 
structure of the company and estimate the cost of debt and the equity. In WACC calculation it 
is suggested to use only market values, especially regarding equity. When concerning debt I 
will use book values because the market value of the debt is very hard to obtain.  
Damodaran (2009) summarizes the usual characteristic of debt which includes commitment to 
make fixed payments in the future, payments are tax-deductible and that failure to make 
payments can lead to default. When using this principle, he suggests also including all 
                                               
53 http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/financialHighlights?rpc=66&symbol=FIA1S.HE, retrieved 1.3.2013 
54 http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/Betas.html, retrieved 12/2012 
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interesting bearing debt and the present value of operating lease commitments in the debt 
when calculating WACC. Finnair treats operating lease liabilities of aircraft as rental 
expenses in the income statement. Lease payments due in future years under agreements are 
presented in the notes to the financial statements. At the end of the year 2012, Finnair had 
approximately 128 million shares and the share price was closed at €2.38 resulting to a market 
capitalization  of  €305m.  The  book  value  of  equity  was  at  the  same  time  785.5m.  The  
company had interest bearing debt of €569m and operating lease liabilities amounted to 
463.4m with a common capitalization method where annual lease payments are being 
multiplied by seven. In reality, lease liabilities are lower due to expiring lease agreements. 
Liabilities thus sum up as €1.032 billion and the debt ratio is 0.77. As finance literature 
suggest, I will use the market value of equity in this calculation. In Finnair, the book value of 
equity is used. Although it is against the common theory, they say that lower WACC 
wouldn’t feel appropriate. This leads to a higher WACC and also better capital structure. 
Finnair takes into account also short-term receivables and cash when they determine the 
capital  structure of the company. They thus find the debt ratio to be only 0,5.  As a remark, 
finance lease liabilities are already included in the interest bearing liabilities as a net present 
value of their future minimum lease payments. 
As a risk-free rate I use the Finnish government 10 year bond, which had a yearly average of 
2.0% in November 2012. 55 For the sake of comparison, the yearly average of over €1m and 
over 1 year corporate loans was only 2.39%.56 Twelve month Euribor averaged at 1.3%57 as 
reference rate from Op-Pohjola Group, Op-prime, had a yearly average of 1.4%.58 Because 
fixed-rate loans tend to have slightly higher margins, I estimate a 2.0% margin which results 
as  4.0%  interest  rate.  This  is  my  cost  of  debt  for  an  eight-year  time  period.  For  the  longer  
sixteen-year  term  I  assume  a  slightly  higher  margin  of  2.5%  and  thus  a  4.5%  cost  of  debt.  
Equity risk premium, or expected market return deducted with risk-free rate, is estimated as 
6.0%.59 With given values, I obtain the cost of equity of 9.2% and thus WACC of 4.4%. For 
comparison, HSBC analysed Finnair in October 2012 and ended up with a WACC of 7.8% 
(equity risk premium also 6.0%, risk-free rate 3.0% and sector ? of 1.2). Finnair itself has set 
                                               
55 http://www.suomenpankki.fi/fi/tilastot/korot/Pages/tilastot_arvopaperimarkkinat_velkapaperit_viitelainojen_korot_fi.aspx, 
retrieved 12.1.2013 
56 
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/fi/tilastot/tase_ja_korko/Pages/tilastot_rahalaitosten_lainat_talletukset_ja_korot_lainat_talletust
en_ja_lainojen_korot_fi.aspx, retrieved 18.1.2013 
57 http://www.suomenpankki.fi/fi/tilastot/korot/Pages/tilastot_markkina-
_ja_hallinnolliset_korot_euribor_korot_short_fi.aspx, retrieved 18.1.2013 
58 https://www.op.fi/op?sivu=rates.html&id=32405&group=op_prime, retrieved 18.1.2013 
59 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html, retrieved 12/2012 
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a target of creating positive value over pre-tax WACC of 9.5%. My WACC may seem low 
compared to for example 10-year moving average for the airline industry of 6.0% by Wojahn 
(2012) but this could be explained by the low interest rates and high gearing in the company. 
Finnair itself reports gearing so that the equity value used is the book value. The change is 
significant when I’m using the market value of equity as suggested commonly in finance 
literature. However, as my results already suggest leasing rather than purchasing, if WACC 
would be increased to 6%, the results would be even clearer. 
4.2.5 NPV – Net present value 
??? ? ? ? 	????? ? ??? ???????? 	
?? ???????
?
???
? 	?????? ? 	 ??????? ? ??????
?? ???????
	 
 
Equation 3. Net present value. I = Purchase price, Lt = Lease rental, dept = depreciation, ?c = lessees 
tax-rate, E(RV)N = expected residual value, BV = Book value, WACC = after-tax weighted average 
cost of capital 
 
The net present value method discounts all the relevant cash flows to the present with the 
selected cost of capital or interest rate. Relevant cash flows are purchase price, lease rentals, 	
expected residual value as well as depreciation and lease payment tax shields. Also capital 
gain or loss induced tax effect on residual value is taken into account. In other words, if the 
actual salvage value of an asset is greater than the book value of the asset, the capital gain is 
taxable. Vice versa, the capital loss entitles to tax deductions. Usually net present value 
calculation  contains  also  operating  cash  flows  but  in  this  case  when  comparing  benefits  of  
leasing and buying they can be left out. There could be an additional term for 
increased/decreased operating costs when an aircraft is leased but a company credit rated as 
Finnair does not usually suffer from those, states the Finnair representative. As justified 
earlier, I will use after-tax WACC as a cost of capital in my NPV analysis. Interest tax shield 
is left out form the formula because they have been taken into account already when used an 
after-tax discount rate. There is an upfront lease payment at time zero because lease payments 
are assumed to be made in advance which is the common practice in the industry. 
To clarify, this is a NPV for a lease. When the net present value is positive it means that the 
benefits of leasing an asset are greater than when purchasing one and thus suggests leasing. In 
other words, if NPV is positive the financial costs of purchasing an aircraft are higher than 
when leased. These costs can be compared together because operating costs are same in each 
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scenario. The present value isn’t just some abstract figure but an actual dollar amount of how 
much valuable a specific financing decision is. NPV is thus very popular because it is 
comprehensible and easy to sell for example to the management. Although, in real life and 
also in Finnair percentage returns are even more popular because their quick and easy 
comparability for example with an equivalent loan. So, as discussed earlier NPV has its 
pitfalls and therefore also and adjusted present value is presented. This enables the model to 
discount different cash flows with respective cost of capital and thus taking into account the 
riskiness of the separate cash flows. 
4.2.6 APV - Advanced present value 
??? ? ? ? 	????? ? ??? ????????
?? ? ????
?
???
? 	?????? ? 	??????? ? ??????
?? ??????
 
 
Equation 4. Adjusted present value. I = Purchase price, Lt = Lease rental, dept = depreciation, ?c = 
lessees tax-rate, E(RV)N = expected residual value, BV  = Book  value, rd = cost of debt, re = cost of 
equity 
 
Application of APV into aircraft investment analysis was proposed by Gibson and Morrell 
(2004) with their expansion beyond the classic APV. Their model expands classic NPV by 
discounting the lease payments and loan repayments at the cost of debt to quantify the cost of 
leasing flexibility and discounting the high-risk investing and operating cash flows at the cost 
of equity reflecting the shareholders’ risks. They state that rather than comparing benefits of 
leasing and purchasing together, they should be compared to operating the aircraft. So they 
calculate present values with both NPV and APV for both lease and purchase scenarios and 
then compare them. In their example, NPV-based calculation prefers leasing but with APV, 
the  choice  turns  to  favour  a  purchase.  Overall  values  are  lower  with  APV  because  the  
operating cash flows are discounted using the higher equity rate. This naturally makes it 
harder to sell to the management. On contrary to his analysis, I will compare only the benefits 
of leasing and purchasing together but will utilize the use of APV also in that frame work. 
One should remember that Gibson includes also operating profits in his analysis which I have 
left out for three reasons: simplicity, scarcity of reliable data and due to the fact that financing 
decision can be analysed decently also with plain benefit comparison. 
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As can be seen from the formula above, in my analysis the residual value and its  tax effects 
are  discounted  with  the  cost  of  equity  and  lease  rental  cash  flows  together  with  tax  shields  
with the cost of debt. A noteworthy question here is what should be the discount rate for the 
tax shields. The question is controversial and justified for example because if the company 
does not make profit it cannot capitalize on tax shields. Also tax rates can change. This makes 
them somewhat uncertain and could be argued to be discounted with a higher rate. However, 
traditionally finance literature sees tax shields as riskless cash flows and teaches that they 
should be discounted with the cost of debt and many times even at risk-free cost of debt. (For 
example Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), Myers (1974), Luehrman (1997), Brealey and 
Myers (2003)) But also other opinions exist. Miles and Ezzell (1980, 1985), Harris and 
Pringle (1985) and Ruback (2002) argue for the unlevered cost of equity as Kolari and Vélez-
Pareja (2010) stand for the levered cost of equity to be the correct discount rate. In his APV 
analysis, Gibson (2010) recognizes this difficulty but he still discounts tax shields “just” with 
the cost of debt. In case of Finnair, I think it could be justified to use a slightly higher 
discount rate than the cost of debt because the company didn’t reach for profit in four 
consecutive years until now, which shows the challenging nature of the low-profitable airline 
business. However, discounting with the cost of equity seems also a bit too harsh. Therefore, I 
will discount the tax shields with the cost of debt as traditional literature suggests. 
4.2.7 Sensitivity/break-even analysis 
Also the plain  results from the NPV and APV are of course useful but to increase depth in the 
analysis, I will run a sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis will reveal which input values 
have the biggest impact on the final result or present value. It is very important to be aware 
what kind of influence each variable have before jumping to conclusions. Without sensitivity 
analysis, what might first look as a good decision may quickly backfire if an overly 
predominant variable changes.  
I will study the impact of key variables to net and adjusted present value. This will reveal how 
much  the  present  value  will  change  if  a  certain  variable  alters  for  example  10%.  In  other  
words, how sensitive the financing decision is to the movement of that particular variable. I 
will also show graphically the clearance of the variable before changing the entire financing 
decision. This is often called a break-even analysis. Particularly key variables such as 
purchase price, residual value, lease rate, WACC, cost of equity and cost of debt are 
monitored. 
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I will also include a scenario tool in my model which enables a user to easily change several 
input variables at the same time and see how it affects on the desired other variables as well as 
the financing decision as a whole. For example one could create a scenario of low interest 
rates and a poor state of the economy and enter corresponding input values to the model and 
instantly see what is the suggested financing decision and for example the value of WACC. 
To further develop this idea, an advanced simulation is carried out next called Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
4.2.8 Risk analysis with Monte Carlo simulation 
A Monte Carlo simulation is an enhancement of basic cash flow models. It is a sort of a risk 
analysis tool to bring some more depth and uncertainty consideration to the analysis. The 
basic idea is that certain input variables of the model are given probabilities or distributions 
instead of steady values. This means that with given probability the value of a variable will 
vary within its distribution. After distributions for all necessary variables are determined, the 
otherwise unchanged present value model is run several, in this case, thousand times. This 
will  produce  a  thousand  present  values  and  from  them  it  is  possible  to  calculate  a  mean,  a  
standard deviation and therefore a distribution. And further, with a distribution of present 
values it is possible to present results in form of probabilities. For example: “The present 
value is positive in three out of four times” or “The leasing is more preferable than purchasing 
with a probability of 75%”. 
The state of the economy with respective probabilities is built in the Monte Carlo model. The 
Best- and Worst-case scenarios are given 10% and Mid-case scenario 80% probability, 
respectively. The Best-case scenario assumes a significant increase in travel demand over the 
next twenty years as a result of sustained economic growth and that capacity will continue to 
be slightly below demand. However, economic cycles will continue to occur. The Worst-case 
assumes that capacity will consistently exceed demand because of depressed economic 
conditions and this will occasionally result in depressed prices. During the Mid-case, or 
normal, scenario there will be occasions when capacity exceeds demand and values will drop 
as a result.  
To determine the variables that are given probabilities, my model will emphasize the volatile 
residual values. They have nevertheless a great impact in my model and at the same time they 
are pretty hard to predict. Monte Carlo simulation is like made for this kind of situation where 
we can give a probabilistic distribution to residual values and simulate the most probable 
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values. In Airfinance Annual (2012)60, which is an annual publication of Airfinance Journal, a 
vice president of a well-known valuation company Avitas explains their forecasting models. 
He states that 95% of their forecasted residual values lie within 2 standard deviations of the 
mean and that these 2 standard deviations are +/- 25% from the mean. This statistic includes 
all jets they have valued and takes into account economic and regulatory variables such as 
inflation. AVAC does not present such estimates on the validity of their data but I will utilize 
the above mentioned statistic. To be more conservative I expand slightly the outer limits and 
apply a standard deviation of 15% to my residual value estimation. As a mean I will use the 
residual value from the AVAC data, depending on the state of the economy. An important 
assumption here is that these values are normally distributed and that seems to be the case 
according to Avitas. 
The lease rate in the beginning of the contract is the same as in my basic NPV-model. 
However, the lease rate for remaining eight years is dependent on the state of the economy at 
that time. The state of the economy is also separately simulated at the sixteenth year to 
estimate the residual value. This method recognizes that economic conditions are equally 
uncertain at every point of the contract. Eventually, this simulation enables me to find the 
mean and deviation for net and adjusted present values. Next, I will present the results of my 
model. 
5 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
In  this  chapter  I  will  present  the  results  of  my  analysis  and  discuss  about  them.  First  I  
introduce calculated present values from Net Present Value and Adjusted Present Value – 
methods. Then the results of sensitivity analysis are gone through and finally this chapter is 
completed with the findings from the Monte Carlo simulation.  
                                               
60 
http://www.avitas.com/publications/airfinancejournal/Airfinance%20Forecasting%20Aircraft%20Values%2024-
30.pdf, retrieved 20.1.2011 
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5.1 NPV & APV 
 
Graph 20. Net and adjusted present values in US-dollars according to eight- and sixteen-year time 
period and with worst, mid and best states of the economy. 
 
The figure above presents the results from the net present value and adjusted present value 
calculations. At first glance it is notable that all but two values are positive and therefore 
imply the choice of leasing. Next obvious observation is that present values tend to be higher 
in bad times of economy. When economy is in a depression or more over recession, aircraft 
values are lower than on average and so are lease rates. This naturally favours leasing. Also, 
longer time period decreases the present value. This is due to smaller estimated residual value 
at the end of an agreement. Attention should be paid to the fact that APV is always higher 
than NPV because the residual value is discounted with the higher cost of capital to reflect the 
risk of the shareholders. 
It is generally believed that in short periods of time leasing is always more worthy option. My 
model  seems  to  confirm  that  view  as  all  present  values  are  positive  when  the  chosen  time  
period is eight years. It also looks like that during bad times of economy, it is preferable to 
lease rather than buy. This is natural because during the weak times residual values are lower 
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as well as lease rates. However, it is good to understand that in this basic version my model 
assumes that the chosen state of economy is the same throughout the whole period. This 
means that if for example the best state of economy is forecasted and the time period is 16 
years, both the residual value at time 16 and new lease rate at time 8 are considered according 
to  values  reflecting  the  best  state  of  the  economy.  This  issue  is  fixed  in  Monte  Carlo  
simulation where the state of the economy is simulated separately at time eight and sixteen. 
Anyhow,  the  only  negative  present  values  are  resulted  in  a  situation  where  time  period  is  
sixteen years and the state of the economy is “Best”. This shows that longer the time frame, 
more obscure the financing decision becomes.  
Present values are as a whole quite high because of current situation of exceptionally low 
interest  rates  and  thus  costs  of  capital.  This  seems  to  be  the  right  time  to  lease  rather  than  
purchase an asset. Of course interest rates can and eventually will rise and this effects to this 
decision. The sensitivity analysis will answer the question how much interest rates need to 
change before, ceteris paribus, purchasing becomes more preferable. 
5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
To  determine  what  variables  are  most  prone  to  impact  the  financing  decision,  a  sensitivity  
analysis is run. Key variables such as purchase price, residual value, lease rate, WACC, cost 
of equity and cost of debt are monitored. Because user can select between eight- and sixteen 
year-period and three different states of economy, there is a considerable amount of these 
sensitivity graphs and therefore only the most relevant are presented here. All the break-even 
values can be found in the appendices. 
Of course the most interesting findings of sensitivity analysis are the ones where a relatively 
small change in a variable makes a large impact on the outcome. Therefore, I will concentrate 
more on those situations. In eight-year time frame only noteworthy results were found in a 
strong economy scenario. According to net present value-method and when the chosen time 
period is 8 years, if the price of the asset decreases below $119.3M, Finnair should go ahead 
purchasing the aircraft. (Graph 21)  This  is  actually  very  near  the  current  estimated  price  of  
€119.7M and so even slight change alters the suggestion of the model. At the same time APV 
suggests that the limit is $104M. Although the economic outlook at the moment is poor, in 
eight, let alone sixteen, years' time the conditions might appear highly improved. 
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Graph 21. Sensitivity of present values to price, t = 8. State of the economy “Best”. 
 
In other scenarios the suggestion to lease is so much stronger that it is not sensible to believe 
that any variable would shift significantly enough. However, when the contract length is 
changed  to  sixteen  years,  this  analysis  tool  becomes  more  useful.  During  weak  times  of  
economy, again the price seems to be the most sensitive piece in the puzzle. When the 
economic outlook is estimated as “Mid”, NPV suggests purchasing if the price is reduced 
below $113.0M and APV if below $105.4M. (Graph 22). 
 
 Graph 22. Sensitivity of present values to price, t = 16. State of the economy “Mid”. 
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Graph 23. Sensitivity of present values to price, t = 16. State of the economy “Best”. 
 
Finally, when the state of the economy is “Best”, clearly many variables become more 
influential as the present values circle around zero at these extreme limits. This was the only 
scenario where a “buy” recommendation was given. It can be seen in the Graph 25 that even 
small changes in the purchase price will have an effect on the suggestion of lease or buy. With 
price of $119.7M, about a fifteen million increase in price changes the NPV to positive. 
Alike, only a three million increase makes APV positive. This shows how sensitive this model 
is to price changes in long time frames and when economy is booming, that is values and 
rents are high. 
 
 
Graph 24. Sensitivity of  present values to lease rates, t = 16. State of the economy “Mid”. 
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When time period is 16 years and the state of the economy “Mid”, if lease rate increases over 
7% (NPV) or 15% (APV), which sounds fairly little, the asset should be purchased as 
presented. (Graph 24)  
 
 
Graph 25. Sensitivity of present values to residual value, t = 16. State of the economy “Mid”. 
 
The residual values are in general more sensitive in NPV calculation than in APV, where the 
residual value is discounted with the higher cost of equity.  Overall, residual values make a 
great impact on the financing decision when the time period is longer. Their sensitivity is 
emphasized when the market conditions are expected to be moderate or good. Graph 25 
shows sensitivities of residual values when time is 16 years and economy moderate. It can be 
seen that only a €10M improvement of the residual value makes the NPV negative and thus 
suggests  purchasing.  However,  with  APV  the  lease  seems  to  be  a  clear  choice  as  it  would  
need to residual value to go over $70M to have an effect.  
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Graph 26. Sensitivity of NPV to WACC, t = 16. State of the economy “Best”. 
 
Next, I will present what kind of effect discount rates or costs of capital have on the present 
values. First, as Graph 26 indicates at my pre-determined WACC of 4.4% the NPV is 
negative and therefore suggests purchasing. However, only a minor increase of WACC to 
5.9% will change the present value to positive. In APV calculation the cost of equity however 
isn’t that prone to changes. On contrary, the cost of debt is a sensitive variable. As cost of 
debt for long term debt was determined to be 4.5%, Graph 27 reveals that if it alone increases 
to 4.8% or above, the APV becomes again positive and then favours leasing over purchasing. 
 
 
Graph 27. Sensitivity of APV to cost of debt, t = 16. State of the economy “Best”. 
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To conclude, sensitivity analysis definitely cumulate the information on top of the plain 
present values by showing how changes of key variables affect them. At the same time this 
analysis increases understanding about the model and show some of its weaknesses. It 
becomes evident that especially purchase price has a great impact on the financing decision. 
Although it seems that this model is quite sensitive to price change, this isn’t a big problem 
for Finnair who knows the actual price. This academic estimation will suffer more from this 
issue. 
It also becomes clear that many variables seem to be closer to make a difference on financing 
decision according to NPV. APV on the other hand has more conservative or lagging effect. 
So, if we consider APV to be more sophisticated and correct way of looking this problem, the 
majority  of  the  scenarios  then  quite  definitely  prefer  leasing  of  the  aircraft.  Actually,  with  
caution I can state that only vague condition is when time period is sixteen years and the state 
of the economy is “Best”. With these specifications the theoretical decision can go either way 
quite easily. The sensitivity analysis illustrates the difficulty of estimation when the time 
period is long and uncertainty is thus increased. 
While being quite useful tool, sensitivity analysis is based on ceteris paribus – thinking or that 
only one variable is changed at a time and others are held constant. In real life however, it is 
often necessary to see the effect when several variables move concurrently. That’s why I also 
developed a scenario analysis tool, where it is possible to create different scenarios: This 
means that one can alter easily all the variables needed and see instantly the effect on present 
values and on monitored variables. This is handy considering variables that correlate with 
each other and need to be studied in tandem. For example when economy is struggling, it does 
not affect only on aircraft values and rental rates but also on cost of capital. Next, result 
chapter is concluded by the findings from the Monte Carlo simulation. 
5.3 Monte Carlo simulation 
Finally, it is time to introduce the results from the Monte Carlo simulation. This simulation is 
carried out to find the distribution of net and adjusted present values. The basic idea is that 
some variables are determined to be stable but the most uncertain and most influential values 
are given probabilities or ranges wherein they can move. Then the simulation is run thousand 
times  resulting  a  thousand NPVs and  APVs.  Then  it  is  possible  to  see  their  mean,  standard  
deviation followed by normal distribution. 
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First of all, when the simulation is run 8 years the result is strikingly clear. The NPV mean is 
15.3 with a standard deviation of 11.5 meaning a 90.7% probability that NPV is positive. 
APV is even more confident as the model returns with a sounding 99.9% probability for a 
positive APV. This can be interpreted so that if the financing horizon is only eight years, with 
these assumptions leasing is a definite choice. 
When the horizon is lengthened to 16 years, the increased uncertainty can be observed but 
simulation still speaks quit strongly in favour of leasing. Mean of the NPV is 5.6 with a 
standard deviation of 10.8. This lowers the probability of positive NPV to 69.7% which is still 
dominating but clearly not decisive. This suggests that longer period improves the 
profitability of the purchase alternative. Respective figures for APV are mean 14.2, standard 
deviation 9.4 and probability for positive APV 93.6%. Although the suggestion isn’t that 
crushing, also in this case the results speak for themselves. It is distinctively clear that the 
longer the financing horizon the more the suggestion turns towards the purchasing an asset. 
However, in shorter time horizon the choice of leasing is very clear. This seems to support my 
hypothesis and the current market consensus, the increasing popularity of leases among 
airlines. 
 
 
Graph 28. Monte Carlo simulation. Normal distribution of NPV and APV, t=8. 
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Graph 29. Monte Carlo simulation. Normal distribution of NPV and APV, t=16. 
6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Limitations and summary of the study 
This thesis has presented literature and different valuation methods of leasing and has used 
cash flow based methods Net Present Value (NPV) and Adjusted Present Value (APV) to 
determine whether it is preferable to purchase an Airbus A330 airliner for Finnair or operate 
one under an operating leasing agreement. The model was further enhanced with Monte Carlo 
simulation to capture the risk associated especially with residual values. At the same time I 
have tried to answer my hypotheses. My first hypothesis, “operating lease is more cost-
effective than purchasing in less than 10 years' time”, was in my opinion confirmed quite 
clearly. The results from both NPV and APV were indisputable. The second hypothesis 
argued that this holds also if the time period is extended. The result is debatable. Although 
APV still very strongly suggests leasing over purchasing, NPV starts to draw nearer to 
purchasing. Still statistically leasing is the preferable choice but it is apparent that when the 
time period is lengthened, the purchase becomes more tempting. Indeed, even Finnair itself 
states that owning aircraft is the most cost-effective way of financing in the long run. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis cannot be confirmed but is rather undecided or even 
rejected. 
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To summarize, it seems that in current market environment Finnair should lease the A330 
under an operating lease agreement rather than buy it. This is true especially if they are 
considering a rather short deployment, which seems to be the case as this investment in my 
opinion is only a temporary solution as the deliveries of A350 are delayed. Although interest 
rates are low which could encourage direct debt finance, this theoretical model illustrates that 
financing costs of leasing are lower than costs related to purchasing.  
When studying this lease or purchase question, the nature of the analysis has to be taken into 
account when evaluating the limitations of this study. Even the basic cash flow based models 
have several different variables and therefore require many presumptions, for example when 
calculating the cost of capital. When the analysis is enhanced with probabilities, and therefore 
inserting uncertainty, the amount of subjectivity is further increased. In this thesis many 
assumptions and some subjective views from the references needed to be applied. All this 
have naturally impacted on the results of this model and needs to be understood. 
In addition, when assessing flexibility, all the possible benefits, gains or elasticity induced by 
flexibility are impossible to incorporate into the analysis. Therefore some amount of 
sentiment is always included in the decision making. But to restrict managers from artificially 
increasing the discount factors the risk analysis tool of Monte Carlo analysis was introduced 
to capture the risk. It would be good to incorporate the risk in the decision making and to 
challenge also board members to take the uncertainty into account in their decision making 
rather than having just yes or no suggestions to financing decisions. 
The basic problems related to Monte Carlo simulation are usually mean reversion and 
autocorrelation. Gibson (2010) gives a notable example of autocorrelation by explaining the 
relationship between aircraft market values and operating lease rates. In my model this does 
not seem to be a problem because they both depend on the state of the economy which my 
model acknowledges. Mean reversion means that in a cyclical industry, many inputs tend to 
correct themselves over the cycle, reverting to a long-term trend or average.  Another 
limitation is the volatility. The NPV and APV are both subject to the assumption of a constant 
discount rate throughout the project.  Turner and Morrell (2002) point out that discount rate 
estimates are variable, and clearly, companies’ costs of capital vary over time. This is 
however, not taken into account.   
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6.2 Future research 
To further enhance this analysis, a substantial amount of new variables could be assigned 
distributions in Monte Carlo simulation. This would even further increase the accuracy of the 
model and even more consider different uncertainties. Another possible improvement is 
related to involvement of more cash flow variables. For example, pre-payments (purchasing) 
could be taken into account, as well as lease reserves. Also, the model does not take into 
account the time difference between the time of order and delivery. Usually an airline is 
obliged to make pre-payments, probably in many instalments, before the actual delivery of the 
aircraft. Sometimes even three years prior the delivery. It is estimated that even 30% of the 
aircraft is already paid when it arrives.61 This is a deadweight cost for an airliner because this 
does not increase revenues or lower the costs. However, my model does not at the moment 
recognize it, which means that the purchase price is somewhat underemphasized. Also 
possible pre-payments or certain reserves of lease are excluded. Maintenance reserves, 
however, are included in the lease rates as AVAC declares. The future research of this subject 
could be applied also to markets. It would be interesting to find out how markets react to 
acquisition news if it is announced whether the asset is leased or purchased. 
  
                                               
61 https://www.iata.org/publications/airlines-international/august-2010/Pages/07.aspx, retrieved 9.10.2012 
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8 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Finnair key figures in 2012. Source: Finnair. 
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Appendix 2. The amount of unencumbered and encumbered aircraft in Finnair.  
Unencumbered means the asset is not as collateral in any agreement and thus can be used as one in the future. Source: Finnair. 
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Appendix 3. Financing decision model. Net Present Value and Adjusted Present Value. 
 
 
 
 
$ (1 000 000)
State of the economy MID Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
List price (Airbus, 01/12) 239,4 Loan
Price reduction 0,5 Debt outstanding 95,76 95,76 89,78 83,79 77,81 71,82 65,84 59,85 53,87 47,88 41,90 35,91 29,93 23,94 17,96 11,97 5,99
Price 119,7 Principal -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99 -5,99
CMV 106,0 Interest -4,31 -4,04 -3,77 -3,50 -3,23 -2,96 -2,69 -2,42 -2,15 -1,89 -1,62 -1,35 -1,08 -0,81 -0,54 -0,27
Debt 95,8 Interest Tax shield 1,12 1,05 0,98 0,91 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,63 0,56 0,49 0,42 0,35 0,28 0,21 0,14 0,07
Advance rate 0,8 Net cash flow 95,76 -9,17 -8,97 -8,78 -8,58 -8,38 -8,18 -7,98 -7,78 -7,58 -7,38 -7,18 -6,98 -6,78 -6,58 -6,38 -6,18
Residual value 30,8 63,2
30,8 "Implicit interest premium analysis" 105,997 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06 -4,06
t (years) 16 Implicit interest 5,25 %
Lease rate, monthly, t=1-8 0,840 0,84 Premium 0,75 %
Lease rate, monthly, t=9-16 0,653 0,6528
Tax rate 0,26 Operating lease
Annual depreciation 0,05 Purchase/Sell price 119,70 0,0 -30,8
Maintenance reserves Lease Payments -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83
Risk-free rate 0,02 Maintenance reserves 0,00 -1,78
Debt interest, t=8 0,04 Tax shield on lease payments 2,62 2,62 2,62 2,62 2,62 2,62 2,62 2,62 2,04 2,04 2,04 2,04 2,04 2,04 2,04 2,04 0,00
Reference rate 0,013 Tax shield on maintenance reserves 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,46
Margin 0,02 Lost depreciation tax shield -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56 -1,56
Debt interest, t=16 0,045 Net cash flow 112,24 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -33,67
Margin 0,025 Discount Cash Flow FACTOR 1,00 0,96 0,92 0,88 0,84 0,81 0,77 0,74 0,71 0,68 0,65 0,62 0,60 0,57 0,55 0,53 0,50
After-tax cost of debt 0,030 Discount cash Flow   112,24 -8,64 -8,27 -7,93 -7,59 -7,28 -6,97 -6,68 -5,22 -5,00 -4,79 -4,59 -4,40 -4,21 -4,03 -3,86 -16,95
Cost of equity 0,092 Cumulative Discount Cash Flow 112,24 103,60 95,33 87,40 79,81 72,53 65,56 58,89 53,67 48,67 43,88 39,29 34,90 30,69 26,65 22,79 5,83
12/2012 Number of shares 128 M 3 % 8 %
Share price 2,38 € APV
Market cap 305 E Cash flows discounted with cos t of debt -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -10,08 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -7,83 -1,32
Book value of debt 1 032 D Cash flows discounted with cos t of equity 122,32 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 0,48 -32,35
E/(D+E) 0,23 % Net cash flow 112,24 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -9,02 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -7,35 -33,67
D/(D+E) 0,77 % Discount Cash Flow FACTOR (debt) 1,00 0,96 0,92 0,88 0,84 0,80 0,77 0,73 0,70 0,67 0,64 0,62 0,59 0,56 0,54 0,52 0,49
WACC (after-tax) 0,044 Discount Cash Flow FACTOR (equity) 1,00 0,92 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,64 0,59 0,54 0,49 0,45 0,41 0,38 0,35 0,32 0,29 0,27 0,24
Equity risk premium 0,06 Discount cash Flow   (debt) -10,08 -9,65 -9,23 -8,83 -8,45 -8,09 -7,74 -7,41 -5,51 -5,27 -5,04 -4,83 -4,62 -4,42 -4,23 -4,05 -0,65
Beta 1,2 Discount cash Flow    (equity) 122,32 0,98 0,89 0,82 0,75 0,69 0,63 0,58 0,24 0,22 0,20 0,18 0,17 0,15 0,14 0,13 -7,91
CAPM 0,092 Discount cash Flow    (TOTAL) 112,24 -8,67 -8,34 -8,02 -7,70 -7,40 -7,11 -6,83 -5,27 -5,05 -4,85 -4,64 -4,45 -4,27 -4,09 -3,92 -8,57
Cumulative Discount Cash Flow 112,24 103,57 95,23 87,22 79,51 72,11 65,00 58,17 52,89 47,84 43,00 38,35 33,90 29,63 25,54 21,62 13,06
NPV (by Excel FUNC) 5,8
NPV (by formula) 5,8 Depreciaton
APV (by formula) 13,1 Value start of year 119,70 119,70 113,72 107,73 101,75 95,76 89,78 83,79 77,81 71,82 65,84 59,85 53,87 47,88 41,90 35,91 29,93
Lease or buy? (NPV) LEASE Depreciation 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99 5,99
Lease or buy? (APV) LEASE Value end of year 119,70 113,72 107,73 101,75 95,76 89,78 83,79 77,81 71,82 65,84 59,85 53,87 47,88 41,90 35,91 29,93 23,94
Data
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Appendix 4. Monte Carlo Simulation results and frequency graphs. 
       
Time horizon Number of Samples 
NPV 
Mean 
NPV - Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
APV 
Mean 
APV - Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
          
8 1000 15.3 11.5 (76%) -17.6 48.6 27.8 8.67 (31%) 3.1 52.9 
16 1000 5.6 10.8 (194%) -35.1 37.1 14.2 9.37 (66%) -19.2 39.9 
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Appendix 5. Break-even values of purchase price and residual value in millions of dollars. 
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Appendix 6. Break-even values of WACC, cost of equity and cost of debt in percentages. 
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Appendix 7. Break-even values of lease rate changes in percentage. 
